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Military clubs, or "open messes" as they have sometimes
been called, constitute a long standing tradition in the
American armed services. Like many other military traditions
such as saluting, uniforms and frequent household moves, clubs
have become so ingrained in the minds of service members and
their dependents that they have often been taken for granted.
Newly arrived personnel, as part of the indoctrination process,
are customarily briefed by their counterparts as to the loca-
tions of the local military retail merchandise outlets (ex-
changes), military supermarkets (commissaries), military
recreational facilities, and military clubs. These activities,
which are lumped together under the generic term--morale , wel-
fare and recreation (MWR) activities- -can be found on almost
every post/base regardless of its geographical location.
For those persons assigned to overseas bases or to bases
in remote U.S. areas, the exchanges, commissaries, recreational
facilities and military clubs assume greater importance. MWR
facilities at remote and overseas military installations may
represent the only readily accessible and affordable outlets
for off-duty recreation, entertainment and material needs of
assigned military personnel and their dependents.

Top level military officials have long since recognized
that MWR activities can contribute much to a successful base
operation. In the case of single junior enlisted personnel,
the morale effects of adequate MWR activities, or a lack of
the same, often are very pronounced. For these service mem-
bers, idle time and restless energy often, like heat and
flammable fuel, form a dangerous, easily ignitable mixture
under uncontrolled circumstances [Ref . 1] . Military clubs
and other MWR activities help provide local commanders with
a vital form of safe release. For the more senior married
service members, MWR activities can serve to provide social
and entertainment outlets which compensate to a degree for
disruptions in family life caused by frequent moves, family
separation, and long working hours; all of which are endemic
to most military occupations.
Local base commanders can use MWR activities to build
unit pride (Esprit de Corps). Unit sponsored picnics, bowling
teams, formal dinners, wives clubs, and cocktail hours are
examples of activities which can relieve tensions and foster
group morale. The military clubs have been particularly
important in this regard, though their contribution to the
morale of service personnel is probably impossible to quantify,
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to examine the present
organizational structure of the military club system. This is

important because, as noted in subsequent chapters of this
study, various Congressional committees and subcommittees,
Department of Defense (DOD) internal audit agencies, and the
General Accounting Office (_GA0) have raised questions about
the organizational structure of the military clubs. These
critics have contended that decentralized military club
organizations reduce the ability of military clubs to provide
recreational and entertainment services to military personnel
and their dependents. Though acknowledging shortcomings in
club operations, DOD club officials have maintained that
shifting operational control over club activities from the
local to a headquarters level would only serve to create an
unnecessary management layer. Thus, there is a fundamental
difference in management philosophy between the organization
charged with running the military clubs (e.g., DOD) and organ-
izations empowered with oversight over military club operations
(e.g., Congress, GAO, DOD internal audit agencies).
In evaluating the relative merits of a centralized/decen-
tralized club management system, the objectives of military
clubs should be kept in mind. These objectives have been
promulgated, albeit in broad terms, in numerous DOD instruc-
tions and directives.
Military clubs, one of eight DOD designated MWR categories
(see Appendix for a description of the DOD MWR categories) have
been organized to help foster some general DOD MWR objectives.
DOD Directive 1330.2 dated 17 March 1978, for example, states:
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... It is the policy of the Department of Defense to fund
a well-rounded morale, welfare and recreational program
to:
a. Maintain among its personnel a high level of
esprit de corps, job proficiency, military effective-
ness, educational attainment and physical well-being.
b. Promote and maintain the mental and physical
well-being of DOD personnel.
c. Encourage DOD personnel to use their time con-
structively and creatively by participating in programs
that help to develop and maintain motivation, talent,
and skills which contribute to the ability to discharge
their duties as service members and as responsible
citizens
.
d. Aid in recruitment and retention by making service
with the Department of Defense an attractive career.
e. Assist service personnel in adjusting from civilian
life to a military environment upon entry into the service.
f. Assist in providing a community support environment
to dependents of service members, particularly in the ab-
sence of military sponsors while at sea, on unaccompanied
tours, on maneuvers, or involved in armed conflict.
In specific terms related to the military club organiza-
tional structure, this study parallels the approaches of
Congressional committees and GAO and addressed the following
questions [Ref . 2] :
1. Does the present DOD club structure make efficient
use of available resources (manpower, material, and
money)
?
2. Is the present DOD club structure applicable to the
current and anticipated military environments?
3. Can the present DOD club structure ensure that policies,
rules, and regulations promulgated at high echelons
are carried out at the operational level?
4. Is the present DOD club structure adaptable to changing




5. Does the present DOD club structure provide the vast
majority of active duty service personnel with an
"acceptable" level of service?
The study was not intended to present any new radical
proposals for changes in club management organization or
policy. Instead, emphasis was placed on examining the full
range of organizational options that already have been pro-
posed by various parties involved in the military club arena.
C. METHOD EMPLOYED
Interviews with club officials and a review of available
printed material were used to prepare this study. The inter-
views were conducted with club managers, Congressional staff
members, service headquarters club management officials, and
representatives of professional club management organizations.
The purpose of these interviews was to surface and compare
varying views on military club management from a variety of
individuals who have been actively involved in operating,
advising, or overseeing military clubs. Some of the comments
made by these club officials were "off the record"; conse-
quently some sources of information are not cited directly
in the text of this study.
Review of applicable written material provided insights
into the history of the military clubs, past and present club
problems, club financial data, additional viewpoints of cog-
nizant club officials, information regarding legislative and
legal actions pertinent to club operations, results of various
12

club management studies, and background information on the
evolution of the present club organizational structure. Syn-
thesizing the diverse information obtained during the research
phase was necessary in order to place the club structure in
its proper perspective relative to the larger organizational
entities (DOD, the executive and legislative branches of the
Federal Government, the American political system, America as
a whole) under which it operates. Finally, having looked at
the club system on a DOD-wide basis, a sub-set of the DOD
club system (the Navy club system) was examined in more detail
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II deals with the historical origins and evolution
of DOD clubs. While not directly related to present day mil-
itary club management, understanding the traditions, history,
and past club operating policies and procedures shed consid-
erable light on the why's and wherefore's of the contemporary
DOD club organizational structure.
Chapter III examines changes in the military club system
during the 1970s. The effect of increasing Congressional
scrutiny, DOD audit agencies recommendations, in-house DOD
management initiatives, and external factors are discussed
in detail.
Chapter IV shifts the focus of the report from the DOD
to the Department of the Navy (DON) level. The DON club
structure is outlined and contrasted with club systems of
the other armed service branches as well as with other DOD
13

MWR activities (i.e., exchange, recreational activities, and
commissaries)
.
Chapter V restates some of the problems and challenges
that face the Navy club system as it moves into the 1980s.
Management options are presented which could, in the opinion
of the author, be utilized to deal with potential and existing
impediments to effective military club operations.
Finally, in Chapter VI, some proposed changes in the Navy
club organizational structure are presented. The proposed
structure is suggested as one way to meet DOD and DON club
objectives, satisfy mandated regulations and guidelines im-
posed by higher authority, minimize organization resistance
to change, improve efficiency of operations, and improve the
overall level of service to military personnel of all ranks.
While the conclusions reached are primarily related to the
Navy club system, it is felt that they have a high degree of
applicability to club systems of all four armed services
branches (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy).
14

II. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF TODAY'S
MILITARY CLUB SYSTEM
"... 'Do you know who made you?'.. 'Nobody, as I knows on,'
said the child, with a short laugh... 'I spect I grow'd' ..."
(Topsy-- from Uncle Tom's Cabin
by Harriet Beecher Stowe)
A military club is something of a hybrid between a com-
mercial food and entertainment outlet and a non-profit business
organization. To the extent that military clubs must generate
enough revenue to cover their operating costs, profit is
important. However, unlike their commercial counterparts,
profit alone does not represent the "bottom line." Military
clubs have to ensure that their prices, hours of operation
and types of services offered support the needs of the mili-
tary members that they serve--even if profits are reduced in
the process. A basic understanding of the origins and evolu-
tion of military clubs highlights some of the unique features
of military clubs and consequently is covered in this chapter
prior to any further discussion of the military club system.
A. ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY CLUB SYSTEM
It would be very difficult to pinpoint a particular time
and place when and where the first military club began opera-
tions. Military cluhs, in the manner of "Topsy," appear to
have arrived on the scene without the planning and ceremony
that accompany birth. Understanding the haphazard and somewhat
15

bizarre history of military clubs and other related MWR
activities is fundamental to understanding some of their
present day organizational, financial, and operational
features.
To begin with, as Noone points out, "Neither armies nor
navies have ever supplied all the needs of their men." Art-
icles of clothing, food, liquor, etc., which the military
logistic systems could or would not supply, but for which a
demand existed, were often provided by itinerant merchants
who followed the armies from camp to camp. Known by many
different names, in America these independent businessmen
were called "sutlers." Descriptions of sutlers are mentioned
in writings dating as far back as the memoirs of Caesar [3].
The American Articles of War of 1776 authorized sutlers
for a fee, to sell convenience and necessity items not issued
by the Government. Sutler fees were used by local commanders
to fund post schools, bands, and emergency relief funds. The
sutler system was replete with many abuses- -notably high
prices, shoddy merchandise, and usurous interest rates. Num-
erous cases of fraud and corruption of military officials also
helped give the sutler system a bad name. In 1866 the Army
was authorized by Congress to sell provisions to the troops
at cost- -giving rise to today's Army Commissary system. The
sutlers, or post traders as they were later called, continued,
however, to sell retail merchandise and alcoholic beverages
to the soldiers. Their decline, and eventual disappearance,




"Bumboaters" were the naval counterparts of the sutlers.
For centuries these private merchants met ships in foreign
ports and attempted to sell sailors any and all items that
seamen could not otherwise obtain through military channels.
As in the case of the sutlers, the quality and often the
questionable legality of their merchandise, exorbitant prices,
and their penchant for bribery, led to their demise [5],
Bumboaters and sutlers, their deficiencies notwithstand-
ing, filled important voids in the lives of soldiers and
sailors. Doing away with these private retailers forced the
military services to provide alternatives. Commissaries were
instituted to provide fair priced and quality food outlets.
Requirements for providing retail merchandise, entertainment,
and recreational services, that is, MWR, began to be met by
the formation of service sponsored groups at the local level.
The following example of an early attempt to form a military
sponsored MWR activity was noted in a 1977 report issued by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) [Ref . 6]
.
In 1840 an Army commander set aside a room at his post
where reading and writing material, games, light food,
and beverages were available to the soldiers. His ob-
jective was to encourage his troops to spend their off-
duty time in a wholesome environment rather than carouse
in the nearby town and all too frequently end up in the
guardhouse as disciplinary cases.
The canteen was a success and was copied throughout
the country. Post canteens resembled a combination gen-
eral store and social club with moderate prices. Any
profits were used to improve canteens and could also be
distributed to detachments whose men patronized them.
One of the earliest canteens was challenged by local bus-
inesses. But the local commander permitted it to continue,
17

based on the justification that guardhouse confinements
decreased by 62 percent after the canteen opened. Such
appeals to temperance and moderation became a strong
argument for having canteens.
The history of the canteens demonstrates at least three
points
:
1. Canteens were started at the local level to fill a
MWR need noted by the base commanders- -not by higher
echelon Army Department officials.
2. Canteens were successful ventures- -both from financial
and social vantage points. Their success prompted the
emergence of bigger and better canteens at other posts.
3. Local businessmen challenged the propriety of the
military vice civilian businessmen sponsoring such
activities
.
These three points and their ramifications are recurring
themes in the evolution of today's DOD and Navy club systems.
They will be examined in greater depth in subsequent sections
of this report.
In all probability, there were attempts, similar to those
of the Army, made by Naval commanders during the nineteenth
century to establish "canteens" aboard ships and at shore
bases. Historical data available to substantiate these efforts
is sketchy. Testimony given during 1949 Congressional hearings
on post exchanges, however, does make mention of the establish-
ment and successful operation of post exchanges at the Olongapo
and Cavite Marine barracks in the Philippine Islands around
the turn of the century. Their success prompted the Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps to recommend that every Marine Corps
base be authorized a post exchange. By the time that the
18

Assistant Secretary of the Navy got around to formally author-
izing the establishment of Marine exchanges on 20 June 1912,
all but two post traders' stores had been eliminated in favor
of command sponsored exchanges [7] . Additional testimony
given before tlie 1949 Congressional panel discussed early
versions of "ships' stores" afloat and "ships' service stores"
ashore, the latter activity being the antecedent of the present
day Navy Exchange system [Ref. 8].
1. Ship's Stores Afloat
... There was developed onboard naval vessels, in the
years preceding the Spanish-American War, the canteen
financed by voluntary contributions from the officers
and crew, later repaid from profits. These canteens
endeavored to provide some of the comforts of life to
naval personnel. They were operated in a most informal
manner with little concern for accountability or respon-
sibility. The cruise of the White Fleet around the world
in 1908 proved the inadequacy of the canteen system and
Congress subsequently authorized the establishment and
operation with appropriated funds of ship's stores [9].
2. Ship's Service Stores Ashore
... Ship's service stores ashore were small concessions
operated for personal profit by enlisted. However, as
it became necessary to expand the scope of the operation,
the concession became quite profitable and the question
of control became a problem. Ship's Service Stores were
authorized as official sale activities by the Navy Regu-
lations of 1923, which provide for operation of the stores
with non-appropriated funds under the direction of command
officers, and required that profits be used for the welfare
and recreation of naval personnel. The profits subse-
quently became the prime source of funds for welfare and
recreational purchases [10].
Note that the ashore-based Ship's Service stores were
authorized, somewhat belatedly again, as non-appropriated fund
activities. The afloat Ship's Stores, on the other hand, were
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authorized as appropriated fund activities. Curiously,
profits resulting from the Ship's Stores afloat operations
are treated as non-appropriated funds. Though it is impos-
sible to precisely determine the Congressional intent, if
any, of funding afloat and shore based Ship's Stores differ-
ently, it is possible that the drafting legislators consid-
ered the afloat stores more essential than the shore-based
Ship's Service stores. At any rate, a clear cut distinction
in funding methods was made between the afloat and shore-based
stores. As discussed in a later chapter, no such distinction
between "essential" and "non-essential" military clubs has
ever been made by the services.
Though there are no existing regulations which prohibit
it, off-duty fraternization between commissioned officers and
enlisted personnel has long been frowned upon in the military
services [Ref. 11]. The services' traditional view has been
that off-duty socializing between officers and enlisted per-
sonnel would:
1. Be detrimental to maintaining good order and discipline
(e.g., after imbibing alcoholic beverages, an enlisted
man might not show decorum to a commissioned officer
or senior non-commissioned officer--or vice versa).
2. Cause personnel of all ranks to feel inhibited by the
presence of their superiors/subordinates.
3. Cause a deterioration in the military performance of
the units involved.
Inasmuch as history tends to perpetuate itself, one of
the end results of segregating military social clubs by rank
20

has been to foster and perpetuate the idea that any other
arrangement would not work.. Even at small remote posts,
where generally accepted business principles would seem to
favor consolidation of small individual clubs into a singular
entity, there has been strong pressure, from officer and en-
listed personnel alike, to continue the practice of maintain-
ing rank-segregated facilities. The blunt comment of an
anonymous Navy off icer, responding to a recent GAO military
club questionnaire, illustrates how strong feelings can run
on this issue [12]
.
Mixing enlisted and officers at clubs not only ruins
the family atmosphere I desire, but also is a detriment
to proper good order and discipline. It's fine to visit
the CPO (Chief Petty Officer) Club and Enlisted Club when
invited for special occasions such as Chief's initiation
or "we passed the big inspection" ship's party but not
for continued social fraternizing. I also feel that my
sailors would not desire their commanding officer to be
dining out and drinking, etc., in "their" club. It would
inhibit some and embolden others. Believe me. If a club
is not profitable, close it. Simple as that.
Though the missions and scope of club operations have
increased through the years, the concept of decentralized
management has remained as a cornerstone of the Services'
club management philosophy. While commissaries and exchanges
have opted for central management by large military agencies
[13] day-to-day management of military clubs has remained a
function of the local commander. Within guidelines promul-
gated by DOD and Service headquarters, local commanders tra-
ditionally have been free to operate their clubs as they pleased,
Top echelon Navy officials, as well as officials of the other
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services, have consistently defended their decentralized club
management policies [14J. The following extracts from testi-
mony given by DOD and Service officials before a 1979 HASC
panel demonstrates this management philosophy.
Major General R. Dean Tice, USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Military Personnel, Policy, Department of Defense:
... We do not agree (with GAO) that centralized manage-
ment at the Department of Defense level will be either
more effective in terms of personnel support or more
efficient in terms of controlling costs. This is cer-
tainly not to say, however, that we currently enjoy the
optimum in organizational structure or management tech-
niques- -either within the open mess systems or the overall
morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) program. There is
always room for improvement... [15].
Major General James C. Pennington, the Adjutant General,
Department of the Army:
... Removal of officer, NCO and enlisted clubs from the
local commander's operational control would inhibit the
commander's ability to implement a comprehensive, mutually-
supporting installation MWR program serving the diverse
elements of the post population. The local commander
is in the best position to adapt the club programs to
installation peculiarities such as mission requirements,
demographics, and facilities available, and to appraise
other local conditions and requirements which influence
club programs and services. The installation commander
uses the club to help build unit cohesiveness and esprit
d'corps and can encourage maximum use of the club... [16].
Major General Leroy W. Svendsen, Jr., Commander Air Force
Military Personnel Command:
... Increased centralization diminishes the individual
troop's view of his or her self -worth and importance to
the Air Force while continued emphasis on the individual
military unit and geographic family has the opposite and
desired effect. These factors mandate that the Air Force
remain loyal to its concept that command is responsible
for the well-being of the troops and combat readiness of
the force. Further, removal of the open mess from the
local commander's authority would reduce his or her flex-
ibility to meet emergency and/or contingency requirements.
22

We, for out part, are doing everything in our power to
ensure that command has available all necessary tools and
resources to carry out those responsibilities. The local
commander is still in the best position to identify and
take effective steps to satisfy the needs of his or her
troops and the requirement of the command... [17].
Brigadier General Hugh S. Aitken, Director Manpower Plans
and Policy Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps:
... I would now like to address our club operations.
These operations are predicated on a policy of central-
ized policy development at the Headquarters level with
decentralized control of day-to-day operations vested in
the installation commander. We have traditionally main-
tained that the local commander must have the prerogative
of making management decisions in relation to the instal-
lation requirements. Notwithstanding this, we recognize
that our management philosophy must be continually re-
assessed with a view toward improvement and heightened
efficiency. As we indicated in our response to the GAO
report, we are doing just that... [18].
Rear Admiral Fran McKee, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Human Resources/Director of Human Resources
Management Division:
. . . Enhancing the quality of life and the Navy members
and their dependents is an integral and vital part of the
human resources management responsibility included in the
Navy's overall mission...
. . . This mission cannot be completely accomplished from
the highest headquarters level. While technical guidance
and direction for these activities is provided by the
Chief of Naval Personnel, the local administration is
a command responsibility. Execution of the day-to-day
management of messes and package stores is accomplished
by commanding officers- -using whatever resources legally
available to them, both in terms of personnel and finan-
cial support... [19].
The official position of the Services regarding decentral
ized management of club operations was debated by GAO. GAO
stated that the scope of military club operations had long
since expanded beyond the point where local commanders, un-
trained in business procedures and steeped in military tradi-
tions, could effectively manage military clubs [20].
23

B. LEGAL STATUS OF MILITARY CLUBS
The following definition of a Non-Appropriated Fund
Instrumentality (NAFI) was taken from th.e Department of
Defense (DOD) Personnel Manual for Non-Appropriated Fund
Instrumentalities [2Q] .
An integral DOD organizational entity through which
(a) an essential Government function is performed, and
(b) other DOD organizations are provided or assisted in
providing morale, welfare and recreational programs for
military personnel and authorized civilians. The NAFI
is established and maintained individually or jointly by
the heads of the DOD components.
(a) As a fiscal entity, the NAFI maintains custody
of and control over its nonappropriated funds, and is
also responsible for the prudent administration, safe-
guarding, preservation, and maintenance of those
appropriated fund sources made available to carry out
its function.
(b) The NAFI contributes to the morale, welfare,
and recreational programs of other organizational entities
when so authorized, is not incorporated under the laws
of any state or the District of Columbia, and enjoys the
legal status of an instrumentality of the United States.
The NAFI's status as Federal instrumentalities has period'
ically come under legal challenge. The distinction as to
whether or not NAFIs are are recognized as private organiza-
tions or Federal instrumentalities is not merely an academic
question: it has several far-reaching implications. For
instance, Federal activities are generally exempt from tax
laws of the states and other localities. Also, state regu-
latory powers over Federal activities are very limited.
Specifically, in the case of military clubs, liquor taxes,'
other beverage taxes, licensing fees, and state wage laws
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could be imposed if military clubs are not legally recognized
as Federal instrumentalities.
Attempts have been made by various state and local agencies
to impose taxes on NAFIs. A review of a few relevant legal
cases is important in order to demonstrate the financial ad-
vantages that NAFIs gain from their Federal status and to
emphasize the fact that there are people and organizations in
the civilian sector who would like to reduce the scope of NAFI
operations
.
In early court cases involving the legal status of NAFIs,
presiding judges found no legal precedence on which they could
base their decisions as to whether NAFIs were Federal instru-
mentalities or not. Consequently, they tended to look to
Armed Service regulations for guidance. Since the Constitution
delegated the Executive branch, and its agency heads, authority
to make rules and regulations governing day-to-day operations
of their agencies, presiding judges in NAFI cases reasoned
that Service regulations have the effect of law [22].
Interestingly, Service regulations governing the opera-
tions of clubs and other NAFIs were issued well after these
organizations began operations. Nonetheless, in all cases the
Services eventually got around to formally "blessing" their
existence and drafted regulations to govern their operation.
Usually the process occurs the other way around: regulations
followed by organizational growth [Ref . 23J
.
The legal cases noted below demonstrate how NAFIs have
benefited from their status as Federal instrumentalities:
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Edelstein vs. South. Post Officers' Club, Ft. Myer, Virginia
(1951) - -Federal court ruled that a contractor cannot sue a
club unless it waives its right of sovereign immunity as a
U.S. agency [24]
,
United States vs. Tax Commission of Mississippi, et al.
C1975) - -Supreme Court ruled against the State Tax Commis-
sion's attempt to require out-of-state liquor distillers
and suppliers to collect and remit to the State tax in
the form of a wholesale markup on liquor sold at clubs
on two Navy bases [25J.
Tall City Brewing Company vs. Reeves, et al
.
(1941)--
U.S. District Court ruled against attempts by Kentucky
Revenue Commissioner, Clyde Reeves, to force the Post
Exchange to procure a Kentucky liquor license and to pay
tax to the state on liquor sales [26].
County of Culpepper, VA vs. Richard W. Etler (1963)--
U.S. District Court ruled that even though the trustees
of an Air Force Officers' Club violated certain service
regulations in buying a piece of real estate, the property
was still not subject to state taxation [27].
C. SOURCES OF CLUB REVENUE
Over the years sources of military club revenue have
varied. The early military clubs' only direct revenue sources
were profits from sales and dues levied upon members [28],
Excess funds were used at the discretion of the local command-
ers to improve the lives of their troops [29] . The clubs
received some indirect support in that the buildings they
occupied, the men who operated them, and the furniture and
utilities that they used were all provided at no cost to the
club. Over the years this indirect support gained formal
acceptance by top military officials and the Congress.
In 1891, Congress authorized appropriated funds to buy the
buildings of the few remaining post traders [Ref . 30] . Shortly
thereafter, the Army authorized the post canteens (by then they
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were called exchanges) to use Army buildings and transporta-
tion that was not needed for operational purposes [31] . The
Army Appropriation Act of 1903 went further and provided
appropriated funds for:
... the construction, equipment, and maintenance of suit-
able buildings at military posts and stations for the
conduct of the post exchange, school, library, reading,
lunch, amusement rooms, and gymnasium... [32].
After nearly a hundred years of voluntary self-sufficient
operations, NAFIs had gained a more secure place in the mili-
tary establishment. Succeeding Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
later, Air Force, appropriation acts have all included some
appropriated funding for clubs and other NAFIs [33]
.
There have been a few occasions when the policy of provid-
ing appropriated support for NAFIs was seriously challenged.
In 1932, complaints by business groups almost persuaded
Congress to abolish the military exchanges at all but the most
isolated bases. The following year a House committee, inves-
tigating Government competition of all types with private
business, also tried to do away with the clubs and other NAFIs
They stated that:
1. NAFIs did not save the taxpayers any money because the
"free" services that NAFIs used were not charged as
operating expenses;
2. Since NAFIs' retail operations were not taxed, the
Government was losing tax revenues greater than the
profits generated by the NAFIs;
3. Civilian enterprises could provide the military with
all the MWR services they needed at bases that were
not located in isolated areas.
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The War Department argued, for the first time, that NAFIs
were necessary to promote enlistments, in view of the low
military pay scales at the time. Although the relative merits
of opposing viewpoints were not resolved, when the votes were
counted the Bill failed to carry [33] . World War II came and
further talk of diminishing MWR activities for the military
was shelved [34]
.
D. POST- WORLD WAR II CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
After the War, a special subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee began hearings to determine the extent of
military retail competition with the private sector [35] . The
hearings were primarily concerned with the exchange system,
but in a larger sense, they impacted on all revenue producing
NAFIs (e.g., clubs, package stores). Retail merchants and
trade associations had complained that exchanges, package
liquor stores and clubs were unfairly competing against pri-
vate businesses. The subcommittee basically agreed with the
merchants and recommended rules which limited the types of
goods that exchanges could sell. The subcommittee also
stated that [36]
:
1. The principal source of MWR programs should be appro-
priated funds and not profits generated from NAFIs.
2. Low military pay scales was not sufficient justifica-
tion for having exchanges, clubs, and package stores.
The military had a staunch defender in the presence of
the Honorable Carl Vinson (Dem - -Georgia) , Chairman of the
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House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Rep. Vinson noted,
while questioning a private industry representative, that
NAFI profits had recently financed construction of a military
golf course in Florida. He stated further that the House
Appropriations Committee, in accepting the golf course for
the Government, stipulated that maintenance of the course
must not come from appropriated funds . The following excerpt
from the 1949 HASC hearings points out the fact that fully
appropriated funding of MWR programs was considered by Vinson
and many other Congressmen to be politically impractical.
Mr. Vinson: "... The only way you can get a recreation
program is through some money from some profit made from
these stores. And we passed the bill out of the committee
this week--it comes up next week--to correct that and to
put the obligation on the Government. But it was speci-
fically written in this bill."
Mr. Sullivan: "That is the sentiment of the merchants of
America. They believe that recreation facilities should
be provided for by the Government and not by putting the
exchanges in direct competition with the retail stores
and forcing them to expand their operations for profit
purposes, to make more money."
Mr. Vinson: "May I say this, Mr. Chairman: I doubt very
seriously if this committee would be able to convince the
Congress that we should buy golf courses and tennis courts
and maintain them, because from what they think about the
brass now, there is no telling what they will do when we
present a bill to buy a golf course. You may be sound
and may be correct about it and that may be the proper
thing* to do, but there are 435 Members of Congress over
there and I doubt very seriously if you will find many
of them that will agree to taking $100,000 to buy a golf
course for the admirals and generals to play on.
"The only way they can swing them is to get some money
from some other source, because I know, and my colleagues
here know, and you gentlemen know, there will be a howl
all over the country that we are spending Government money
to buy golf courses, tennis courts, and bowling alleys for
the Service. I agree with you. You are probably absolutely
correct, but we have to be realistic about this. [37].
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The end results of the 1949 hearings were that:
1. The exchanges were put on notice that there were
limits on the extent of competition they could offer
to private businesses.
2. Congress recognized for the first time, if only in an
unofficial fashion, that NAFI profits were necessary
in order to fund MWR programs due to the political
impracticality of supporting MWR programs solely from
appropriated funds.
Congressional oversight over NAFIs and MWR programs did
not stop with the 1949 hearings. Subsequent hearings between
1949 and 1972 are listed below [38]
.
1. HASC- 19 53 : Reviewed questions brought forth in the
1949 hearings. Concluded that reducing the scope of exchange
operations further would destroy the exchanges and serve to
weaken the ability of the military to enlist and retain qual-
ified personnel.
2. HASC- 1957 : Considered a DOD request to raise the
price ceilings on certain authorized exchange retail items.
Over the strong objection of retail associations, Congress
approved price increases on most of the DOD requested items.
3
.
Senate Committee on Government Operations - Investiga-
tions Subcommittee, 1968-72 : Chaired by Senator Abraham
Ribicoff (Dem. -Connecticut) , this panel:
a. Investigated charges of fraud and corruption in
military clubs and exchanges in South Vietnam.
b. Concluded that DOD had not exercised sufficient
controls over NAFIs and MWR programs.




d. Recommended that DOD establish a central agency to
manage a consolidated MWR program.
4. HASC- 1970 : Comprehensive review of exchange and com-
missary operations. Panel criticized DOD emphasis on profits
vice welfare of patrons, questioned the DOD practice of invest-
ing in long-term securities while deficiencies in existing
MWR facilities existed, and chided DOD for being unable to
effectively manage MWR programs. One recommendation of the
panel was that stronger Congressional oversight was needed in
the MWR area . To this end, it was proposed that a permanent
subcommittee on MWR programs be established to look at the
full range of DOD MWR programs and issues.
5
.
Deliberations by the Nonappropriated Fund Panel,
Subcommittee on Investigations- -HASC since 1972 : Originally
chaired by Representative Bill Nichols (Dem. -Alabama) . This
panel, hereafter referred to as the NAF panel, differed from
previous panels in several ways:
a. It was not formed in response to a scandal or a
complaint from the civilian sector. The NAF panel represented
an attempt by Congress to get involved in the MWR oversight
process before problems or complaints surfaced.
b. The NAF panel was established as a permanent panel
that planned to hold subsequent hearings, to review DOD imple-
mentation of its recommendations.
c. The NAF panel looked at the entire scope of MWR
operations (e.g., clubs, exchanges, recreation programs, movie
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exchanges, commissaries, and motion picture services), not
just one small segment.
d. The relatively stable composition of NAF panel
members and expertise provided by professional staff person-
nel, gave the NAF panel "corporate memory" that was missing
in previous Congressional bodies looking into the MWR area
[39].
The opening statements made by Chairman Nichols during
the 1972 hearings emphasized this change in operations:
... There have been times in the past when hearings have
been conducted, reports submitted, recommendations made,
and no follow-up has been initiated to determine what
effect these studies, reports, and recommendations have
had. This subcommittee will not only review these oper-
ations, but I can assure you, will continue in the future
to monitor its findings, conclusions, and recommendations
[Ref. 40].
The 1972 NAF panel heard 26 witnesses, took fourteen hundred
pages of testimony, and published a report containing six
general recommendations [Ref. 41]:
1. On each base that had authorized package beverage
outlets, small package stores should be consolidated
into larger package stores. All profits accruing
from liquor sales should be turned over to the base
welfare fund to be used by the base commander for the
benefit of all personnel under his command.
2. Approval of alcoholic beverage outlets should be re-
evaluated every three years by the Secretary of each
service branch.
3. The military department should establish systems and
procedures to identify the cost of appropriated fund
support to MWR programs.
4. Each military department should establish a central
agency to manage its MWR program.
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5. A separate DOD audit agency should be established to
audit MWR activities.
6. Each military department should review its MWR invest-
ment practices with the objective of using accumulated
funds expeditiously to provide direct benefits to
military personnel.
DOD and Department of the Navy (DON) responses to these
recommendations are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
In some cases, the recommendations were carried out as directed,
In others there was a great deal of "foot dragging." Subse-
quent NAF panel hearings in 1977 and in 1979 reviewed DOD
implementation efforts on the 1972 recommendations and sug-
gested other areas of management improvements. It can be said
that the 1970' s marked a point where Congress finally took the
reins of the DOD MWR program and demanded that the services
fall in line. The ad hoc, loosely structured MWR management
style that had become a tradition in each of the services
would no longer be exempt from Congressional review. The
results of this change in the Congressional oversight function
has had an impact on DOD and Navy club operations.
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III. THE 1970s: A DECADE OF CHANGE
FOR THE MILITARY CLUB SYSTEM
This panel, as a general rule, holds with tradition
and military clubs are a tradition in the armed services.
We do not feel, however, that support of tradition re-
lieves us of the obligation to examine and if appropriate,
to recommend changes which would benefit the individual
service member or dependent...
(Representative Dan Daniel
Chairman, 1979 NAF Panel
extract from 1979 club hearings)
The 1970s was a decade of change for military clubs. Pre-
vailing policies and practices which heretofore had gone un-
challenged, came under closer scrutiny by reviewing authorities,
both internal and external to DOD. The above quotation by the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Nonappropriated Fund
Panel (NAF) panel chairman Representative Dan Daniel (who, by
virtue of his seniority, succeeded Representative Nichols in
1977 as NAF panel chairman) typified the increased high level
focus on improving management of military clubs.
A. INCREASED CLUB OVERSIGHT BY VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
DOD internal audit services (i.e., Army, Navy, and Air
Force Audit Services) and GAO became very aggressive during
the '70s in reviewing club operations and highlighting noted
deficiencies. The Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) , for
example, conducted four hundred and eighty audits of Navy
clubs and package stores between fiscal years (FYs) 1972 and
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1977 [Ref . 42J . These audits were not limited to fiduciary
and compliance checks, but also dealt with controversial areas
involving efficiency and effectiveness of management opera-
tions .
The 1979 NAVAUDSVC report on Chief of Naval Personnel
(NAVPERS) MWR management was a case in point. The auditors
recommended that NAVPERS [43]:
1. Utilize a greater percentage of centrally managed MWR
funds previously held in reserve to meet contingent liabili-
ties, to fund worthwhile MWR construction projects; club con-
struction was included in this category.
2. Assume Navy-wide control over recruitment, hiring,
career development and evaluation of club and package store
managers. At the time of this writing, this function was
still being handled by local commanders.
Audit recommendations of this type forced service officials
to reevaluate and sometimes change their policies and proced-
ures relating to club management. In instances where they
refused to accede to auditors' suggestions, club officials
were forced to document the reasons for their dissent.
As stated in the preceding chapter, one of the outgrowths
of the Ribicoff hearings in 1969-70 was authorization allowing
the General Accounting Office (GAO) full access to Nonappro-
priated Fund Instrumentalities (NAFI) records. During the
'70s GAO became an active participant in the Governmental
oversight process of military clubs. Acting at the request
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of various Congressional bodies, GAO issued several reports
which impacted on military clubs. The GAO reports, which
often contained recommendations contested by armed service
officials, were widely disseminated and read by interested




Appropriated Fund Support for Nonappropriated Fund
and Related Activities in the Department of Defense , Report
#FPCD-77-58, August 1977- - indicated that the Government spent
$600 million each year to subsidize MWR activities.
2 Cash and Investment Management of Department of Defense
Nonappropriated Funds Needs to be Improved
,
Report #FPCD-78-15,
January 1978- - recommended that MWR funds invested in non-
governmental securities be deposited with the Treasury Depart-
ment. Also noted problems and inconsistencies in DOD agency
investment management practices.
3 Military Personnel Cuts Have Not Impaired Most Morale
Welfare and Recreation Activities
,
Report #FPCD-79-54, July
1979--stated that the FY 1978 Congressional reduction in the
number of military personnel assigned to NAFIs had no signif-
icant effect on these activities. The report also projected
that proposed FY 1979 cuts in MWR appropriated fund support
would have little impact on NAFIs and that at least $5,700




4. Changes. Needed in Operating Military Clubs and
Alcohol Package Stores - -Volumes I and II , Report #FPCD-79-9
and #FPCD-79-9A, dated 15 January and 23 April 1979 respec-
tively.
B. THE GAO CLUB REPORT
The last two-volume GAO report noted above was prompted
by a written request from the Chairman of the House NAF panel
subsequent to the 1977 club hearing. The 1977 club hearings
centered around DOD implementation of the 1972 NAF panel
recommendations and recommendations contained in earlier GAO
reports. Based on the 1977 hearings, members of the NAF panel
felt that in spite of some improvement in DOD club operations
since 1972, military club management was still deficient in
many areas. The GAO club review, conducted during 1973 at
selected installations of the four armed services contained
the following recommendations:
The Secretary of Defense should:
1. Strengthen management of the system by transferring
responsibility for club operations from installation
commanders to a strong central management authority.
The present decentralized system has not been effec-
tive. A structure consisting of representatives from
each service would provide that their specific needs
receive appropriate attention. Such an action will
require extensive planning and preparation. During
the transition, the services should transfer respon-
sibility for club operations from the installation
commanders to their headquarters and assign club
management personnel to these authorities.
2. Direct that profits from package store operations be
used primarily to support essential morale, welfare,
and recreation activities benefiting all base personnel.
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Profits distributed to clubs should be limited to
helping essential, financially troubled facilities
to break even or finance capital improvements after
all reasonable attempts to attain self-sufficiency
have failed. These profits could be also used to
fund indirect operational expenses associated with
the central management authority.
3. Direct that package store and club operations be
separated as they have been by the Army and Air Force
in Europe to provide a clearer picture of club oper-
ations and package store distributions.
4. Direct that dependence on appropriated fund support
to clubs be reduced and that the services civilianize
club operations to the maximum extent practicable
using nonappropriated funds.
5. Direct the military services to seriously consider
consolidating club services when all attempts at
achieving self-sufficiency have proven unsuccessful.
Consolidation should be planned and designed care-
fully to ensure improved services to all eligible
personnel . .
.
In effect, GAO recommended changing from the existing
military club system to one in which local commanders would
be removed from direct operational management. The report
cited examples of situations where local commanders had
directed actions which adversely impacted the financial sol-
vency of the military clubs under their jurisdiction. These
actions included:
1. Establishing stringent club guest eligibility criteria
This action severely reduced club patronage at an already un-
profitable club by prohibiting club members of one military
pay grade from bringing guests of a lower/higher grade into
the member's club. For example, a non-commissioned officer
(_NC0) could not bring junior enlisted personnel (pay grades
E-l through E-4) or an officer into the NCO club.
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2. Continuing unprofitable operations at clubs which
were underutilized and in heavy competition with commercial
establishments and other nearby military clubs.
3. Directing the continuance of non-essential and highly
unprofitable club food operations. In one instance an internal
audit agency recommendation to eliminate the noon meal at a
club was ignored by the local commander even though patronage
for the noon meal was almost nil and expenses far exceeded
revenue
.
4. Allowing "tradition" to overrule viable attempts at
consolidation of small, unprofitable clubs even in the face
of possible closure of certain clubs due to impending financial
insolvency.
5. Prohibiting personnel in uniform from being served
alcoholic beverages during certain hours of the day despite
the fact that there are no service regulations which impose
or even suggest such a restriction.
It should be noted that GAO made no mention of instances where
local commanders were supportive of efficient club management
policies
.
Volume two of the GAO club report contained results of
a very extensive patron survey designed to measure service
members' perceptions of military club operations. Strict
adherence to generally accepted statistical procedures was
undertaken to ensure the validity of the responses [45]
.
GAO stated that in their opinion the survey showed that:
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1. Although 56 percent of the military population uses
the club once a month or more, 44 percent never uses
it or uses it infrequently.
2. Overseas clubs are used considerably more often than
clubs in the United States despite a significantly
less positive attitude by service member toward the
clubs
.
3. Junior enlisted personnel are attracted by the clubs'
low drink prices and entertainment and because the
clubs are often one of few places available where
they can eat, drink, and socialize. Poor entertain-
ment, poor atmosphere, and preferring not to socialize
with military personnel were reasons not to use the
clubs
4. Senior enlisted personnel use the clubs to cash checks,
for low drink prices, to socialize with their peers,
and because the club is often one of the few places
available. Many do not use the club because of poor
entertainment, atmosphere, service, and employee
attitude, or because the club is inconveniently
located.
5. Officers feel pressured or obligated to join their
club but view it as a good place to socialize with
their peers. They do not use the club because of its
inconvenient location, poor food quality and poor
entertainment.
6. Many enlisted personnel thought their club atmosphere
was too military, too rowdy, or too ethnically
oriented; and many officers thought the clubs were
too military or too formal and old-fashioned.
7. If negative aspects were improved or eliminated, 45
percent of the population would increase their patron-
age.
8. If further actions are necessary to reduce operating
losses, enlisted personnel would prefer to consoli-
date into "all ranks" facilities rather than modify
prices and services or close unprofitable clubs.
Officers would rather retain the traditional separa-
tion of ranks by increasing prices or reducing services




There were significant variances noted in survey responses
received from particular sub-groupings of personnel broken
down by pay grade and/or branch of service. Figures 1 and 2,
which are extracted from the GAO club report, show how various
segments of the sample group differed in their responses to
survey questions pertaining to "reasons for using the clubs."
Figures 3 and 4 show aggregate responses of each strata of
respondents to the question of: What is the most important
reason for using the clubs? These bar graphs point out how
perceptions of military clubs differ depending on the rank
and/or service affiliation of survey respondents. For example,
figure 1 shows that a higher percentage of Air Force personnel
responded that they used the clubs for check cashing than
their counterparts in the other branches of the armed services.
While little or no disagreement was generated over the
validity of the methodology and raw results of the GAO patron
survey, interpretation of the significance of the responses
varied. GAO contended that the survey clearly showed that
decentralized management was not working, both in terms of
patron usage and perception of the clubs. DOD club officials
in their official testimony before the 1979 NAF panel stated
that they felt that while the GAO survey was informative, it
did not conclusively show that the present club system was
not working well. Informal discussion with various Navy club
officials during the course of research for this report left
the author with, the distinct impression that these officials
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felt that the GAO report had more merit to it than the Navy,
at least, wanted to "officially" admit. These officials did
not testify before the 1979 NAF panel however, and their views
may not have been representative of the majority of Navy man-
agers. However, shortly after the release of the GAO club
report, the Navy contracted a private consulting firm to per-
form an analysis of club operations [46] . Testimony given by
Army, Air Force and Marine Corps representatives before the
1979 NAF panel indicated that they, too, were conducting
similar in-house or contractor studies on military clubs and
other MWR activities. Though the services may have questioned
the significance of the GAO report, it was followed by a great
deal of soul-searching among DOD club officials.
C. THE 19 79 HASC NAF PANEL HEARINGS
The NAF panel conducted public hearings on military club
operations during October, 1979. In addition to representa-
tives of the armed services and GAO, the panel heard testimony
from club managers, former club managers, and members of the
International Military Club Executives Association (IMCEA)
,
a professional organization of military club managers [47]
.
In March of 1980 the panel issued a report summarizing its
findings and recommendations. The NAF panel's findings
included:
1. DOD package liquor stores are very profitable . For




2. Military club operations, excluding package store
operation, are not self-sustaining . In FY 1978 DOD clubs
reported an aggregate net deficit of $18.3 million despite
receiving $98 million in appropriated fund support and $40
million in dues levied on members [Ref. 48].
3. The armed services, with the exception of the Navy
and Europe-based Army and Air Force clubs, had not complied
with the 1972 NAF panel's recommendation to separate club and
package store fiscal operations .
4. The armed services had not complied with the 1972 NAF
panel's recommendation that package store profits should be
applied to post/base welfare funds (i.e., recreational services
--camping equipment, boating, gyms, child care services, etc.)
vice military clubs. For example, in 1978 74 percent of all
DOD package store profits were plowed back into the clubs.
5. There were no common DOD guidelines for distributing
package store profits . The Navy, for example, left total
discretion for package store profit distribution up to the
local commander. The other services required "some" portion
of package store profits to be applied to recreation activities
In actual practice, the overall dollar value of package store
profits applied to recreational activities by each of the four
armed services lagged behind the amount of package store
profits distributed to the military clubs. In many cases the
disparity between recreation and club percentages of local
package store profits was wide [49] . Even with this "support"
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from package store profits, 22 percent of the clubs still
lost money during FY 1978. Without the package store profit
"support," the percentage of clubs losing money during FY 78
would have swelled to 57 percent. Figure 5 contains detailed
profit/loss figures, package store profit transfers, and
amounts of appropriated fund support for FYs 1977 and 1978.
6. By distributing club and package store profits at the
local level vice on a service-wide basis, the services have
ignored their worldwide club requirements . In effect, the
rich clubs at heavily populated bases continued to get richer,
while many of the clubs located at small, isolated bases
within the continental United States (CONUS) , continued to
have a hard time financially. Figure 6, for example, shows
that as of the end of FY 78 every Navy club with cumulative
cash balances greater than $100 thousand also received sig-
nificant package store contributions during the same year.
Under the Navy centralized banking system, club profits are
plowed back to the contributing clubs, the cumulative cash
balances of the "rich" Navy clubs increased annually. Mean-
while, some Navy clubs with no package stores or a small
patron base had to resort to dues, higher prices, and/or
reduced levels of service in order to stay solvent [50]
.




MILITARY CLUB FINANCIAL INFORMATION
FYs 1977 and 1978
Appropriated Fund Support
CMill ions) Increase/ % Increase/
FY 7 7 FY 7 8 Decrease Decrease
Army $29.6 $33.3 + 3.7 + 12.5
Navy- 21.5 26.9 + 5.4 + 25.1
Air Force 35.2 30.6 -4.6 -13.1
Marine Corps 6.7 7.1 + 0.4 + 0.6
Total $93.0 $97.9 + 4.9 + 5.3
Club Prof its (Losses) with/without
Package Store Profit Distribution
Reported Net
Loss Before Income after
Package Store Package Store Package Store
Distribution Distribution Distribution
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
FY 77 FY 78 FY 77 FY 78 FY 77 FY 78
Army $-1.0 $-2.3 $11.4 $13.6 $10.4 $11.3
Navy -4.0 -5.9 8.7 10.2 4.7 4.3
Air Force -10.1 -9.3 12.9 13.6 2.8 4.3
Marine Corps -0. 5 -0.8 1.8 2.
1
1.3 1.5
Total $-15.6 $-18.3 $34.8 $39.5 $19.2 $21.2
Number of Percentage of Unprofitable Clubs
Before Package Store After Package Store
Distribution Distribution
Number Percent Number Percent
FY77 FY78 FY77 FY78 FY77 FY78 FY77 FY78
Army a/139 1Q9 a/53 42 59 41 22 16
Navy 188 216 55 40 89 72 29 26
Air Force 202 189 61 59 90 88 27 27
Marine Corps _U Jl4 _5_6 _59 _T7 _8 2_5 15
Total 571 558 57 56 255 209 26 23
a/ Estimates based on Army data
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NAS Norfolk 5530 ,163 3 84,,002
METC Mewport 672 ,045 37,,725
NAS Memphis 390,,339 69,,604
NAVSTA Charleston 166 ,769 29,,513
CBC Port Hueneme 153 ,906 32,,726
NTC Orlando 137,,356 10 ,327
WPNSTA Yorktown 146 ,346 24,,726























MCAU—Mess Central Accounting Unit, Located at Patuxent River, Maryland
CONUS—Continental United States
CCMO—Commissioned Officers' Mess Open--Of ficers ' Club
CPOMO--Chief Petty Officers' Mess Open—Chiefs' Club (Enlisted Pay Grades E7-E9)
POMO—Petty Officers' Mess Open—Petty Officers' Club (Enlisted Pay Grades E5-E6)
EMO—Enlisted Mess Opne—Enlisted Club (Enlisted Pay Grades (E1-E4)
CMO—Consolidated Mess Open—All Ranks Club (Open to all service members)
CBC—Construction Battalion Center




NETC—Naval Education and Training Center






The above figures were compiled from data submitted to the professional staff, House Armed
Services Committee by U.S. Navy, Office of Legislative Affairs under cover letter LA-61:r,





a. Package store profit distribution:
1. Package store operations should be fiscally separated
from club operations so that both, operations are clearly
visible.
2. Package store profits, including their distribution,
should be controlled and centrally managed by the
service headquarters groups, and worldwide needs be
considered when these profits are distributed.
3. Profit goals should be developed for the clubs exclud-
ing package store distribution.
4. With the exception of clubs located at remote and
isolated sites, package store profits not be used as
operating income for clubs. Any distribution to a
club should be an indirect subsidy to offset capital
improvements, construction, or certain administrative
and overhead expenses such as central accounting or
personnel costs.
The panel recognizes that abrupt withdrawal of package
store profits could have an adverse impact on club opera-
tions and, therefore, recommends that the latter recommen-
dation be implemented no later than the end of fiscal year
1982 [Ref. 51]
.
b. Civilianization of club manager positions:
Military club positions should be civilianized to the
maximum extent possible and where feasible, nonappropriated
funds be used for these positions... [Ref. 52].
c. Properly reflecting the amount of appropriated fund
support provided to the military clubs:
(1) DOD should establish the necessary management report-
ing tools to assess appropriated and nonappropriated
manpower utilization and make comparative and trend
analysis among and within each service with the goal
of reducing appropriated fund support.
C2) Appropriated fund support to individual clubs be




d. Establishing stronger central management authority
at the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service head-
quarters levels:
(1) OSD should provide additional staff resources to
effectively carry out its oversight responsibilities.
Service headquarters ' authority to enforce technical
assistance and internal audit recommendations should
be strengthened.
(2) OSD, in cooperation with the services, should develop
one set of standard, simplified regulations similar
to the Armed Services Exchange Regulations. The reg-
ulations should be easy to read and consistent with
standards of the hospitality industry. Recognizing
that profitability is not the clubs' major objective,
the Panel believes that the clubs can be run in a
business-like manner, and that profitability is not
consonant with the clubs' objectives to foster morale,
esprit de corps, and patron satisfaction.
(3) The services should seriously consider centralizing
certain administrative functions such as accounting,
procurement, investments, cash management, and club
manager recruiting and assignments.
(4) The services should continue to take advantages of
training programs offered by other services with the
long-range goal of consolidating training programs




The panel also directed the services to share the findings of
in-house and contractual club studies with the NAF panel and
with each other.
d. Summary of the NAF Panel Report:
Two points are noted here regarding the relationship
between the armed services and the HASC.
First, the HASC, along with its counterpart in the
Senate, is an extremely powerful and important Congressional
committee. No monies can be "appropriated" to DOD and indi-
vidual branches of the armed services without first being
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"authorized" by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.
Therefore, even though control of nonappropriated funds is
technically outside the realm of the HASC , the Committee
wields tremendous leverage over armed service MWR activities
as a result of its direct control over appropriated DOD funds.
Second, the HASC has traditionally been a "pro-military"
committee. While some individual HASC members have on occasion
argued for cuts in defense spending, for the most part the
HASC has supported defense needs. This was especially true
of the NAF panel, whose membership in the '70s included legis-
lators representing Virginia, Texas, Guam, South Carolina,
Alabama, New Mexico and California- -areas which had heavy
concentrations of military installations and constituents.
The overall objective of the NAF panel was to ensure
efficient and effective club management, not to chip away at
the service members* benefits. The opening remarks of Chairman
Daniel during the 1979 hearings emphasizes this point.
Today the panel begins the hearings on military clubs
or "open messes" and the operation of the related alcohol
package stores. DOD considers clubs to be important to
the morale and well-being of service members and believes
they contribute to unit identity, esprit de corps, and
improved combat readiness. In effect, clubs support the
missions of the military services. This committee agrees
with that assessment.
Inquiry hy this panel and others into programs designed
to enhance the well-being of military members and their
families must not be viewed as diminishing support for
such programs. Our objectives are to improve the delivery
of services to those who should be getting them, and our
motivation is to explore alternatives that will accomplish
this. . . [Ref . 54] .
bo

While the 1979 NAF panel reports on military clubs was
critical of some DOD club management practices, an adversary
relationship did not exist between the committee and DOD.
The panel report stopped short of mandating the GAO recommen-
dation of establishing a central DOD club agency, but it
served notice on armed service officials that quick and re-
sponsive implementation of its club management recommendations
was expected [55].
D. DOD ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE CLUB MANAGEMENT
There were attempts by the armed services to improve club
management during the 1970s. Whether or not these changes
were spurred on by external pressure, or resulted from an
internal awareness of problem areas at the DOD and service
headquarters levels, is debatable. Whatever the reasons,
some major changes were made. For example:
1. 1971--The services began hiring CPA firms to conduct
annual "system wide" financial audits of their clubs.
2. 1973--The Navy implemented a standardized central
accounting system for all Navy clubs- -off icer and enlisted.
The Air Force and Army later established similar systems.
3. 1973--Air Force established a central nonappropriated
fund (NAF) procurement office to take advantage of dollars
savings available on large merchandise orders. The Army also
established a NAF procurement office.
4. 1973--The Navy, along with the Air Force and Army,
initiated the California tri-service liquor procurement »
54

service in the San Francisco Bay area. The program allowed
clubs to buy package liquor at the lowest cost from out of
state distributors. In addition to avoiding payment of Cali-
fornia liquor taxes, this arrangement has taken advantage of
economies of scale in purchasing.
5. 1974--DOD issued the DOD Personnel Policy Manual for
Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities, which established for
the first time DOD-wide nonappropriated fund personnel policies
on recruitment, retirement benefits, salaries, labor relations.
6. 1975- -DOD conducted a one-time worldwide survey to
gather demographic data on MWR activities
.
7. 1975--Air Force as well as the other services began
using club "management assistance" teams to provide free
technical assistance to individual club managers.
8. 1975- -The Navy conducted an extensive attitude survey
of 10,000 active duty Naval personnel's leisure time eating
and drinking activities (LTEAD) . The LTEAD survey was widely
distributed to Navy club management officials for use in
understanding and capitalizing on the existing club patron
market.
9. 1976- -The Navy consolidated headquarters management
of all club operations under the Chief of Naval Personnel.
Formerly, enlisted clubs had been managed, along with Navy





10. 1977--As directed by the Senate Appropriations
Committee, "essential" funding requirement for officer per-
sonnel (closed messes) were merged into the mission of the
Armed Services Open Messes (clubs).
In addition to the initiatives noted above, OSD in 1978
formed a DOD MWR coordinating committee made up of high rank-
ing club officials from each of the armed services. The
objectives of the committee were to:
(1) Compile a list of military club functions.
(2) Determine the appropriate level of command which
should exercise decision making authority for each
function
.
(3) Examine organizational responsibilities for estab-
lishing operational guidelines (e.g., dress codes,
hours of operation, profit distribution formulas,
establishment/closure of clubs)
.
Also, a club and package store panel was established as one
of six permanent subcommittees of the MWR committee. The
first written report of the MWR committee was due at the end
of FY 1979.
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY CLUB OPERATIONS
There were a number of factors which affected military
club operations in the 1970s. Double-digit inflation was a
prime example. Wages of NAF employees are evaluated on an
annual basis by the Civil Service Commission. Adjustments,
almost always upward, are made regionally based on comparable
civilian sector salary scales. All NAF employees, including
those whose earnings are heavily supplemented by gratuities
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(e.g., waiters and waitresses) are subject to prevailing
state and federal minimum wage laws. With double-digit in-
flation, the clubs' personnel expenses have increased faster
than revenues.
Federal legislation has also impacted the clubs. Overseas
clubs, for example, must under various status of forces agree-
ments, hire specified percentages of foreign nationals to work
in the clubs. Often labor arrangements worked out are influ-
enced by political and military practicalities rather than
the financial best interests of the clubs. Particularly
burdensome to overseas club managers were [56]
:
1. The inability to hire and fire part-time temporary
employees, as dictated by fluctuations in the volume
of business.
2. The requirement that each club maintain adequate cash
reserves to pay termination fees to foreign national
employees in the event of a base closure.
For both overseas and CONUS-based clubs, health care
provisions, retirement, and leave benefits for NAF employees
were also much more liberal and costly than comparable private
sector restaurant standards [57]. In the case of package
liquor sales, Federal law requires military package store
prices to be within 10 percent of the prevailing local prices.
With repeal of "fair trade" laws in many states, this restric-
tion has resulted in instances where cheaper prices for package
alcoholic beverages can often be obtained at commercial stores
than at on-base package outlets. For example, supermarkets
and discount drug stores can selectively advertise "specials"
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on a particular beer or wine in order to attract patrons into
their stores. Consequently, the base package store price for
the same item may temporarily be higher than the "special"
promotion price at an off-base outlet.
As noted earlier, FY 78 and FY 79 DOD appropriations
contained reduced ceilings on the number of military personnel
assigned to MWR activities. These decreases, in effect, re-
duced the level of appropriated fund support for the military
clubs. Though GAO contended in their 1979 report that the
FY 73 and FY 79 cuts did not appreciably impair operations
at most MWR activities, if the trend continues the clubs at
some point will have to develop new revenue sources to fund
essential functions previously performed "free" by military
personnel
.
Competition from commercial and other on-base dining and
entertainment establishments increased during the 1970s. At
the beginning of the decade, the salary scale for junior en-
listed and officer personnel was so low that in many instances
these personnel did not have sufficient discretionary funds
to use at most off-base clubs. With the advent of the all-
volunteer armed services, pay scales for these junior service
personnel increased, even allowing for inflation. Loss of
significant portions of this "captive market" was felt on the
balance sheets of many CONUS clubs during the early 1970s.
Presidential pay caps on military pay increases and the
increased inflation rates of the later 1970s eroded the
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effects of previous salary increases and consequently a trend
towards increased use of the clubs may be in the offing for
the 1980s. In any event, increases in inflation and salary,
which are both out of control of club officials, can exert
influence on the military club patron base.
On base, competition from fast food outlets operated by
the various "exchange" agencies also siphoned off some poten-
tial club customers. Finally, the 1970s saw an increase in
the number of discos and fast food franchises catering to all
types of entertainment and dining tastes. The military clubs
had to meet the needs of all potential patrons and as a result
lost customers who were interested in obtaining only one
particular type of food or music (e.g., the clubs could not
exclusively utilize a hard rock, country and western, soul
band, as a private club could). Many military clubs tried to
be "all things to everybody" with disastrous financial results
The question of "who to cater to" was complicated by the
fact that although military clubs ostensibly were provided
for the benefit of active duty personnel and their dependents,
retired military personnel often constituted a portion of the
club's patron base. According to GAO, in 1978 between 17 and
18 percent of military club members were retired personnel.
At some clubs, usually those in metropolitan areas, the per-
centage of retirees was much higher. At the Officers Clubs
at the Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida, and at the
Marine Corps Air Station, Santa Ana, California, for example,
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retirees constituted 89 and 43 percent respectively, of the
club members. When coupled with the already wide age scale
of active duty officers (21 to 50 plus years of age) , one can
readily see some difficulties in adequately serving the full
range of entertainment needs of officer club patrons. The
problem has not been as acute with various types of enlisted
clubs which serve narrower age ranges.
Another external factor which further complicated club
management policies was fluctuations in the complement of
military personnel assigned to a military activity. One Navy
club official told the author of a situation at a midwestern
base where the number of authorized officers was reduced by
higher authority from 200 to 54 within one year. Reacting
properly to such a sudden change in club patron base is diffi-
cult at best. At the base in question the club was kept open
because of its isolated location. Membership privileges were
extended to civilian DOD employees in order to offset the loss
of revenue resulting from the decrease in the number of uni-
formed service personnel. Base realignments and closures are
common occurrences in the military and unfortunately not all
clubs are able to find new revenue sources when closures and
realignments occur.
With all of the complications and problems associated with
running a military club, one might ask what type of person
would seek such a job. No hard data on backgrounds of club
managers is maintained by the armed services. Discussions with
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cognizant club management officials, however, indicated that
retired military personnel with service experience in the club
management area have been the prime source of military club
managers. Since the Navy has civilianized its club manager
positions and the other services are under strong pressure to
do the same, the pool of available ex-military club managers
will shrink as time passes. This means that other sources of
club management talent will have to be utilized more (e.g.,
graduates of college level hotel management curricula) . The
International Military Club Executives Association (IMCEA) has
gone on record as being critical of current DOD club manager
recruiting and retention efforts [58] . They contend that
improvements in salaries, fringe benefits, and a competitive
career progression program are needed to ensure that superior
club managers are not lured away by lucrative offers from the
private sector. Presently none of the armed services has
instituted central management of club personnel. GAO
,
NAVAUDSVC, and NAF panel members have been critical of this
deficiency. Representatives of the IMCEA, in testimony before
the 1979 NAF panel, have also supported the establishment of
a central DOD office to handle the recruitment and salary
structure of civilian military club managers. Since the club
manager functions where "the rubber meets the road," any
attempts to improve club management must include provisions




The '70s brought changes to the military club system.
Some changes were initiated by the Armed Services; however,
military club officials, for the most part, operated in a
reactive mode. Congress, GAO, internal audit agencies, and
non-controllable external factors (i.e., inflation, legisla-
tion, all-volunteer military force structure, etc.) exerted
considerable pressure on military club operations. As the
clubs enter the 1980s, one of the challenges that they will
face is: How best to structure and operate a club system
that meets the needs and desires of service members as well





IV. THE NAVY CLUB SYSTEM- -1980
"The basic mission of the Navy Mess (Club) System
is to promote and maintain the well-being, morale and
efficiency of officer and enlisted personnel by provid-
ing dining, social, and recreation facilities. This
mission is in direct support and is an integral part
of the Department of the Navy's primary mission of fleet
readiness of which a vital element is personnel readi-
ness- ••" (Rear Admiral C. J. Seiberlich
1977-
-NAF Panel Testimony)
In the preceding chapters, attention has been focused on
the management and operation of military clubs from a Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) perspective rather than from the vantage
points of the individual branches of the armed services. While
all DOD clubs share some basic features, each service has
established a club system that differs somewhat in organiza-
tional structure and management philosophy from that of its
sister services. Many of these differences can be attributed
to the varying structures, missions, and geographies of each
service. For example, the Navy's reluctance to charge club
dues stems from the transient nature of ship-based sailors-
even during peacetime [59]. Other differences rest heavy on
tradition and as noted by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
,
House Armed Services Committee, Nonappropriated Fund Panel
(NAF) panel members, and internal DOD auditors, their current
applicability has often been exempted (consciously or other-




Ideally, a study of the military clubs should include a
detailed analysis of the organizational structures and oper-
ating procedures utilized in each of the four military club
systems. Time constraints, however, limited the scope of the
study. Consequently, the remainder of this report will deal
principally with the Navy club system. Features of the Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps club systems will be noted only
to contrast Navy practices and procedures.
A. CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE VARIOUS
ARMED FORCES CLUB SYSTEMS
DOD and service instructions emphasize that clubs and
other morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities pri-
marily exist to enhance the quality of life for service mem-
bers. The comments of Admiral Seiberlich, Deputy Chief of
Naval Personnel, reinforces this point. While financial data
on the various military club systems are available and can be
arrayed or manipulated to show how one service branch stacks
up against the others, rankings based solely on this data
might be misleading. Though clearly important to successful
club operations, profits are not the prime objective of mili-
tary club managers. Consequently, in evaluating how well the
clubs are performing, surrogate measures of club patron atti-
tudes (e.g., club usage figures, number of dues paying members,
questionnaires) have sometimes been used to supplement raw
financial data. However, even the patron surveys conducted
by GAO and the services in-hous.e do not provide clear cut
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evidence to support any ranking of the various military club
systems
.
Nonetheless, it was clear to the author in conducting
this research that cognizant officials looking into DOD club
activities (i.e., NAF panel, GAO, auditors, senior club offi-
cials) do tend to rank the club systems in some sort of order.
GAO, and particularly the NAF panel members, stated that of
the four existing service club organizations, the Navy club
system was managed "best." Chairman Daniel, during testimony
given by Rear Admiral Fran McKee, during 1979 club hearings
before the NAF panel, made the following statement:
Your response, Admiral, has been quite adequate, and
we appreciate very much your cooperation.
As a matter of fact, the committee would like to com-
mend the Navy on certain aspects of its club operations,
and package stores. I think the Navy is the only service
which has totally separated package stores from club
operations and developed a separate central fund at the
headquarters level. Also, it operates most of the clubs
without charging dues, which means that Navy clubs are
open to all Navy personnel.
In reading the GAO survey, Navy personnel seem to be
more positive toward their clubs, and particularly their
prices. Reliance on nonappropriated fund support from
package store profits is generally lower in the Navy,
and, finally, in our judgment, based on these reports,
Navy clubs are better managed than are the other ser-
vices, and we do want to compliment you on that... [61].
The NAF panel's response to the Navy Department statements
was in sharp contrast to the panel's appraisal of other DOD
testimony. The difference in the tone of questions put to
Navy representatives, as opposed to their counterparts from
the other services, was so marked that Congressman Daniel
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further explained the difference in treatment. The following
excerpt was taken from the written report of the hearings:
... Projecting my thoughts into the evening, at the local
military clubs I can hear the witnesses who appeared from
the other services saying, "I wonder why that committee
created such a good climate, a favorable climate, for the
taking of testimony from that lady admiral.
Let me make it perfectly clear that we believe com-
pletely in equality.
... I believe that people are motivated by the expec-
tation of reward or the fear of punishment in whatever
form it takes.
The Navy has done an exceptional job, when compared
or measured against some of the other club systems, and,
Admiral, in my judgment you're deserving of reward. [62].
The NAF panel's "positive" perception of the Navy club
vis-a-vis the other services' club systems is important to
the extent that when and if club changes are mandated by the
Congress, the Navy will not have to undergo many changes in
order to conform to the GAO KASC/club models. Figure 7, which
depicts the characteristics, as viewed by the author, of the
four military club systems and the HASC and GAO "model"
systems, points out the fact that the 1980 version of the Navy
club system more closely approximated the HASC/GAO models than
the other services.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY CLUB SYSTEM
Having noted some of the strong points of Navy club man-
agement, it is appropriate to present an overview of the entire
Navy club system. Figure 8 attempts to depict the organiza-
tional structure of the system. The commissary store, ships'
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stores afloat and Navy exchanges have been included in the
diagram in order to show contrasts between these centralized
management organizations and the decentralized organization
of the Navy clubs. The diagram also shows that the Navy rec-
reation program shares the identical organization structure
as the clubs. Figure 9 shows the club and recreation hier-
archy for the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) . Between
the Navy headquarters and local levels, the line authority
hierarchy changes for each particular Navy base, although the
basic organizational structure remains essentially the same
for all Navy clubs overseas or in CONUS. For example, at the
Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California (NAS-iMof fett)
,
three senior commanders (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) , Commander Naval Aviation Pacific (comnavairpac)
,
and Commander Patrol Wings Pacific (COMPATSWINGSPAC) , all
exercise line authority over the clubs. Unlike NPS, where
there are separate recreation and club organizations at the
local level, NAS-Moffett has established a consolidated club/
recreation department. Though they differ somewhat in organ-
izational structure components, NPS and NAS-Moffett clubs are
still operated under the same general guidelines.
C. MANAGEMENT OF CLUBS AT THE BASE LEVEL
While line managers at various Navy echelons can and do
issue pertinent club related instructions and directives,
periodically conduct club inspections, approve operating
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budgets, review club financial statements and approve new
club construction/alteration requests, day-to-day club oper-
ations usually come under the purview of the local commanding
officer (CO). The CO can hire/fire club employees, dictate
hours of operation, standards of dress, membership/guest cri-
teria, price structure for services rendered and entertainment
choices; and as previously noted, delineate package store profit
distribution policy.
In practice, it is the rare CO who has the time to get
too involved at this level. Consequently, at most commands,
organizations have been established to ensure that the clubs
are:
-Responsive to the needs of base personnel;
-In compliance with financial and operational controls
prescribed by higher authorities
;
-Are not guilty of fraud, waste and abuse violations.
A typical local club organization is noted in Figure 10.
Individual local club organizations (such as NPS and NAS-
Moffett) would, of course, vary somewhat depending on the
size of the base involved, number of personnel assigned, and
number of clubs on base.
The significant amount of the CO operational control over
clubs and other MWR activities stands in marked contrast to
his control over many other base support activities. In
recent years the Navy has centralized many base functions and
























CLUB ADVISORY ^ROUP— Representatives of military personnel, dependents,
retirees who advise CO on club operations
LOCAL CLUB AUDIT BOARD—Comprised of military and civilian personnel not
directly involved in club operations. Conducts periodic cash counts,
inventories, and prescribed checks of management operations
CLUB LIAISON OFFICER—Senior club manaqer who may also double as manaqer
of one of the clubs. Usually has charqe of central club operations
(i.e., bookkeeping, payrolls, purchasing, financial reporting)
SOURCE: Bureau of Naval Personnel Training Course
For Local Audits of Nonappropriated Fund
Activities, Workbook ft 1
[•' ij»ure 1 (i
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-Medical/dental dispensaries - -consolidated with regional
medical centers;
-Base maintenance- -consolidated at many large bases under
a Public Works Center;
-Personnel payrolls and administration—consolidated into
Civilian Personnel Offices and Personnel Administration
and Support Service Offices for military personnel;
-Navy Exchanges/commissaries - -under the operational
control of the Navy Resale and Services Support Office
(NAVRESSO)
;
-Disbursing and accounting- - large portions consolidated
at Authorized Accounting Activities (AAAs) . AAAs often
are geographically removed from the bases they serve.
Club officials at the Navy Military Personnel Command-
-
Special Services Division (NMPC--Code 65) noted that many COs
were upset about any further dimunition of their authority and
tend to view club centralization attempts as further eroding
their basic command responsibility. Whether or not this per-
ception of club consolidation is valid, the high degree of
skepticism that many local line managers have toward central
club management initiatives could significantly hinder any
plans to realign the Navy club system.
During the 1979 HASC NAF panel club hearings, club mana-
gers got an opportunity to air their views on military club
operations. Speaking as a representative of the International
Military Club Executives Association (IMCEA) , the manager of
Navy clubs at the Naval Education and Training Center, Newport,
Rhode Island, Mr. Donald Booth, testified that the IMCEA [63]
:
-Believed that package store profits wer not a disincentive




-Believed that a central DOD club agency would only
create an additional management layer and would not
improve club operational efficiency;
-Believed that additional cutbacks in appropriated fund
support for the military clubs should not be enacted;
-Believed that the club patron survey conducted by GAO
showed that military clubs were effectively meeting
the needs of most service personnel.
Mr. Booth also put the IMCEA on record as supporting a
number of other initiatives in the club management area.
These included [64] :
-Reducing the amount of regulations that govern DOD clubs
(to emphasize this point the NAF panel was presented
with three stacks of paper containing Army, Air Force,
and Navy club instructions) [65];
-Establishing a central DOD office for the recruitment
and referral of civilian club managers;
-Establishing uniform classification and pay scales for
civilian club managers;
-Reducing the number of club audits, inspections, and
management assists.
It should be noted that no claim has been made that the
IMCEA positions represented the predominant views of most Navy
club managers; however, as of January 1979, 24 percent of Navy
club managers were also dues paying IMCEA members [66] . Fur-
ther, interviews conducted with Navy club managers surfaced
many of the same positions that were championed by the IMCEA.
If professional club management organizations, such as
the IMCEA are able to articulate the "unfiltered" viewpoints
of military club managers, then IMCEA positions should be kept
in mind and sought out by DOD club officials when considering
alterations to the existing military club system.
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Since Navy clubs fall directly within the line authority
of local base commanders, it follows that the CO ' s personal
assessment of club operations is taken seriously by the club
managers. In an operational sense, however, the technical
guidance and financial controls promulgated by NMPC-Code 65
or by the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) , may be more
important. All Navy clubs are required to:
-Utilize standard accounting systems and forms;
-Input, on daily basis, transaction summaries, all cash
receipts, and all expenditure documents into the Mess
Central Accounting System (MCAS) . Figure 11 shows how
cash receipts are handled centrally by MCAS.
-Be audited on a periodic basis by local audit boards
and by representatives of the Naval Audit Service
(NAVAUDSVC) . In this regard NAVAUDSVC has prepared
standardized audit programs especially designed for
use in club audits;
-Fiscally separate each club and package store (e.g.,
enlisted club sales cannot be merged with those of
the package store or officers' club);
-Reconcile locally maintained accounting statements with
mechanized listing prepared by MCAS from daily transac-
tion inputs (see Figures 11 and 12 for examples of MCAS
financial listings)
;
-Utilize centrally issued pre-numbered checks for all
disbursement other than petty cash transactions;
-Provide prescribed employee fringe benefits (i.e.,
health care plans, retirement benefits, sick leave);
-Conform to federal job wage and classification guide-
lines for civilian employees.
In effect, under the Navy's present club management system,
club financial accounting and reporting functions are centrally
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operation, range, and prices of services provided, package
store profit distribution ratio, membership criteria) which
affect the financial status of the clubs, remain within the
local line management hierarchy.
Two features of the current Navy club management system
stand out.
First of all, local Navy club officials and line managers
can structure club operations to match the tone and tempo of
base operations. For example, at an overseas Naval station
club hours and dress requirements can be temporarily modified
when a large number of ships are in port. This is not to
suggest that similar modifications could not be made if line
management was not directly involved in club operations, but
only to point out that the fact that a CO can unilaterally
take actions to ensure that the clubs are flexible enough to
accomplish their primary mission of "service to the Fleet";
even if profitability is reduced somewhat in the process.
A second feature of the present Navy club structure is
that MCAS provides a number of services to local club manage-
ment. For example, under MCAS, local club managers:
-Have been provided with numerous forms, manuals, training
courses, management consulting services, and control pro-
cedures which have standardized and improved their opera-
tions ;
-Have been relieved of handling investment decisions
regarding club revenues;
-Have increased their control over cash handling through





-Have been furnished with mechanized financial statements
which analyze their operations, point out potential
areas of management problems (see Figure 12), and pro-
vide neat consistent audit trails of past operations.
The cost of these services is 1-1/4 percent of gross sales.
Club managers, bookkeepers, and purchasing personnel inter-
viewed during the course of this research, stated that they
were satisfied with MCAS . This was in contrast to:
-Complaints that some Air Force Club managers had voiced
over overhead charges for the more elaborate Air Force
central accounting and purchasing systems [Ref. 67].
-GAO's and the NAF panel's dissatisfaction with the
Marine Corps almost totally decentralized club financial
management system [Ref. 68]
.
Navy package store operations at the local level have been
an important part of club operations under the present struc-
ture. At most Navy bases, consolidated package stores have
been formed from several smaller outlets previously run by
individual clubs. The 1972 NAF panel, in response to com-
plaints from constituents, raised questions about the prolif-
eration of small club- sponsored base package stores. Access
to these small package stores was limited in some cases to
personnel of particular military ranks. In other instances,
only dues paying club members could use the package stores.
As a result, the 1972 NAF panel directed the services to con-
solidate these small package stores into larger outlets open
to all eligible personnel [Ref. 69]
.
As noted in Chapter II of this report, the 1972 NAF panel
also recommended that the services separate the package stores
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from the clubs and distribute a higher percentage of package
store profits to base recreation activities vice the clubs.
The Navy to date has complied with the first two provisions
of the 1972 NAF panel recommendations, but not with the third
portion dealing with package store profits.
As of the time of this writing, Navy COs were free to
distribute package store profits between clubs and other MWR
activities as they saw fit. For fiscal year (FY) 1978, only
36 percent of CONUS Navy bases and 51 percent of overseas
Navy bases distributed any portion of package store profits
to base recreation activities [70]. At the remaining activi-
ties COs directed that all package store profits go to the
various clubs, usually on percentage basis proportional to
the dollar value of package store purchases made by customers
of applicable pay grades [71]. Recreational activities in
the Navy have thus been dependent on appropriated funds,
revenue generated from recreation user fees, and Navy exchange
profits. Since 1975, system-wide Navy exchange profits (in
constant 1967 dollars) have declined 24 percent [72] , and
appropriated funding levels have also been reduced. As a
result, recreational user fees have in many cases been in-
creased in order to maintain the scope of recreation programs
[Ref. 73J.
Since the Navy, unlike the other armed services branches,
does not charge dues at most clubs, Navy club officials have
argued in the past that the clubs needed the package store
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profits to survive. Navy club officials have also argued
that since the package stores evolved out of the club system,
it was both reasonable and proper that package store profits
should be plowed back into the clubs [74] . GAO and the NAF
panels have been unimpressed with these arguments. The 1979
NAF panel's recommendation that all package store profits be
turned over to recreational activities vice clubs beginning
in FY 1982, presents a problem for Navy club managers.
Ignoring package store profits and dues for the moment,
club revenue is generated at Navy clubs principally by sales
of individual drinks and food. Discussions with club managers
indicated that, in general, bar sales are far more profitable
than food sales. This fact goes particularly hard on officers'
clubs where the ratio of food sales to bar sales is usually
much higher than at enlisted clubs. Officers' clubs also tend
to shun the "fast food" menus that are popular and more profit-
able [75] at the enlisted clubs. In the past, package store
profits allowed food services at officers' and enlisted clubs
to operate at a loss. With the removal of the contribution
from the package store profit, price increases for food,
changes in the type of food service offered, higher liquor
prices, implementation of dues, or some combination of these
initiatives, seems inevitable if the clubs are to remain
solvent.
Personnel management is important to any organization and
the Navy clubs are no exception. As noted earlier, Navy club
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managers are primarily civilians. Although the other armed
service branches have argued that a cadre of military club
managers is needed for effective "command control" and for
assignment to forward based overseas clubs, the Navy club
system appears to operate at least as well with civilian
managers as the other services do with a mix of civilian and
military managers.
As IMCEA representatives noted in their Congressional
testimony [Ref . 76] , decentralized management of club per-
sonnel has its drawbacks. For one thing, decentralized man-
agement makes it very hard to implement a consistent career
development program for club managers. An ambitious person
hired at an entry level club management position probably does
not want to stay at that level indefinitely; particularly, if
the individual demonstrates a talent for effective club man-
agement. Since NMPC-Code 65 does not exercise control over
the hiring, firing, promoting and reassigning of civilian club
management personnel, NMPC-Code 65 cannot ensure that competent
managers have advancement opportunities commensurate with their
talent and experience.
For example, a superior club manager at a small base may
not be aware of and consequently not considered for a higher
paying club position vacancy at another base. Faced with
little prospect for advancement, the manager may be lured away
from the Navy club system to a civilian sector job with better
career potential. NMPC-Code 65 did experiment with a management
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Intern program and a job referral service a few years ago.
However, the program was discontinued because COs were not
obliged to employ NMPC-Code 65 recommended job applicants
[Ref. 77].
Another personnel problem within the Navy club management
system is that civilian employees are funded and governed by
two separate systems:
-Government Service (GS) employees - -paid with appropriated
funds; and
-Uniformed Annual (UA) employees--paid with nonappropriated
funds
.
While the salary scales for comparable employees of each
system are the same, other benefits differ. For example:
-GS employees have a pension plan apart from social security
for which they make contributions from their salaries.
UA employees are excluded from the GS plan and consequently
pay social security tax;
-Prior military service counts toward retirement and lon-
gevity pay scales in the GS system. This is not true
with the UA system;
-Accrued longevity and retirement points earned in one
system cannot be transferred to the other system. Thus,
if an employee's position is shifted from GS to UA or
vice versa, the employee could stand to lose longevity
and pension benefits.
Should the Congress lower the amount of appropriated funds
provided to the military clubs, some GS employees will have
to shift to UA positions. This will impose some hardships on
the clubs since UA employees are paid with nonappropriated
funds
.
To an extent, this dual personnel system has already had
an impact on the clubs. Reductions in the overall number of
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civilian personnel allowed at bases have often forced COs
to choose between having GS club managers or some other
essential personnel. Since the GS club managers, unlike other
civilians, can be shifted to a UA position, local commanders
have in some cases elected to change GS club positions to UA
billets rather than dismiss a non-club GS civilian.
D. OVERSEAS NAVY CLUBS
Overseas Navy clubs are run essentially the same as the
CONUS-based clubs. However, the restrictions on foreign na-
tional employees noted earlier in this report and the presence
of slot machines are two differences. Unlike the Army and Air
Force overseas clubs, which are run separately from CONUS
clubs, Navy clubs worldwide come under one management system.
Slot machines, which were dropped by Army and Air Force
overseas clubs in a "knee-jerk" reaction to the 1968-69 Vietnam
club scandals, have been retained by some Navy (and Marine
Corps) overseas clubs [78]. While the Navy's seven percent
profit margin on slot machines might not be sufficient to
sustain a Las Vegas gambling casino, it has produced a sig-
nificant amount of revenue for overseas clubs ($3.4 million
in the first nine months of FY 79J [Ref. 79]. Twenty-five
percent of all slot machine profits are currently retained
by the Navy Central Club Fund to benefit all Navy clubs. Each




Regarding the moral issue of gambling, th_e official Navy
position [Ref. 8QJ is that with such a controlled low slot
machine profit margin, on-base slot machines are more recre-
ational than other gambling devices. Also, language barriers
and the sometimes questionable reputation of off-base commer-
cially run overseas gambling houses tends to result in a
barrage of petty disputes between U.S. service members and
local foreign nationals. By having slot machines at the clubs,
local commanders can reduce the potential for adverse public
relations with the host country, provide an additional source
of on-base recreation, and increase financial support for club
and other iMWR activities [81] . Though on-base slot machines
inevitably offers unscrupulous club employees the temptation
to steal, the Navy, through a very aggressive and effective
audit program, has been able to avoid the scandals that ended
Air Force and Army slot machine operations [82],
Barring base closure or a reduction in assigned personnel,
CONUS club managers can develop an estimate of their patron
bases which allows them to s )stematically organize their club
programs. At some overseas Navy bases, which service varying
numbers of deployed fleet units (i.e., ships, air squadrons),
it is difficult to tell how many people will be using the club.
Political and military considerations may translate overnight
into full or empty docks and hangar bays. Club managers over-
seas depend heavily on the "fleet" sailors' business, yet they
have no accurate way to predict when or how many "fleet"
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sailors, will be available to use the clubs. This uncertainty,
along with, the inflexible hiring rules on foreign national
employees noted earlier, can cause overseas clubs to lose
money periodically. In such instances where overseas clubs
incur losses due to cyclical changes, NMPC-Code 65 can and
does make loans/grants from the Central Club Fund on a case-
by-case basis [Ref . 83]
.
E. SPECIAL NAVY CLUB SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
There are Naval service traditions and peculiarities that
have fostered unique Navy club system features and constraints.
The relationship between dues and transient "fleet" sailors
has already been discussed. Additionally, while the other
services have developed a tradition of dues at senior enlisted
and officers' clubs, the Navy has gone the opposite way. To
change course now or in the future could easily be perceived
by Navy officers and petty officers as a "breach of faith"
and an "erosion of benefits"; notwithstanding the fact that
comparably paid civilians and military personnel of other armed
service branches are assessed club dues. Consequently, the
possibility exists that a large scale exodus from officer and
senior enlisted Navy clubs could occur if and when club dues
are introduced Navy-wide. In this regard, it is significant
that the record of Navy officer clubs charging membership dues
has not been impressive, which suggests that dues are not a
"cure-all" for the Navy clubs' financial problems [84].
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The somewhat unique status of Navy Chief, Senior Chief,
and Master Chief Petty Officers, enlisted pay grades E-7
through E-9, also affects the Navy club system and consequently
merits some discussion. Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) clubs
are not open to Navy First Class Petty Officers (pay grade
E-6) or to pay grade E-6 service members of other armed ser-
vices. Army, Air Force and Marine Corps senior enlisted clubs
all admit E-6 personnel. Consequently, a Navy base CO, in
addition to providing officer and enlisted clubs, must also
provide two senior enlisted clubs, one club for CPOs and one
club for First Class Petty Officers.
At large populous bases, this additional club presents no
significant problems. However, at locations where the number
of CPOs is small, CPOs expect a separate club and often do not
support a consolidated senior enlisted or enlisted club. In
some locations, such as remote overseas stations, consolida-
tion of CPO clubs with officer and/or enlisted clubs has been
successfully accomplished, but only as the final alternative
to closure [85]. At the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) where
student officers predominate, the 23 CPOs attached to the com-
mand have rarely patronized the NPS enlisted club since their
separate CPO club was closed for economic reasons. Rather
than allow the Chiefs to utilize the Officers Club, NPS plans
to spend club funds to furnish a "CPO annex" to the Officers'
club. The option of allowing CPOs to use the NPS Officer club
has not been elected even though the NPS Officers' club does
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extend membership to civilian faculty and staff members (GS-11
CGS-11 and above) [86J .
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The present Navy cluh system has:
-Attempted to combine elements of centralized and
decentralized management structures;
-Given wide club management latitude to local commanders
and their civilian club managers;
-Centralized accounting and financial functions without
adding an additional layer of management authority;
-Used package store and slot machine profits to subsidize
other club operations;
-Has recognized that unique service traditions impact on
the structure and operations of the Navy clubs;
-Will be faced with a revenue crunch if and when package
store profits/appropriated funds are reduced or with-
drawn from the Navy clubs ; and





V. CHALLENGES FACING THE NAVY CLUB SYSTEM
"What does the future hold for military club systems?
A thorny path, if one is to read the indicators."
CBert L. Shine- -from Officers
Clubs at the Crossroads )
The 1980s could well be a critical time period for the
Navy club system. Problems noted in previous chapters of
this report could be further exacerbated in the upcoming
decade, given certain assumptions. Consequently, in fore-
casting the future Navy club environment, any and all prem-
ises should be clearly spelled out. While some of these
assumptions may appear obvious or trivial to the reader,
system changes which do not take them into account could
subsequently produce some undesired results.
A. NAVY CLUB ENVIRONMENT ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 198 0s
The following assumptions, relevant to future club oper-
ations are based on past events, research into the Navy club
area, opinions expressed by cognizant club officials, and in
some cases, the author's own observations:
1. Navy club management will continue to come under close
scrutiny from the Congress;
2. The level of appropriated fund support provided to the
Navy clubs will not increase (in constant dollars);
3. Navy Exchange profits, will not increase (in constant
dollars) during the next two years;




5. Military pay scales will be competitive with similar
jobs in the civilian sector;
6. Competition from commercial food and entertainment
outlets will continue to attract a segment of the
Navy club patron market; and
7. There will be no U.S. military involvement in a
protracted war.
Reviewing DOD responsiveness (or non-responsiveness to
1972 and 1977 House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Nonappro-
priated Funds panel (NAF panel) club recommendations, one
could infer that some DOD officials did not take seriously
the NAP panel's promise of periodic follow-up on their recom-
mendations. Assumption number one supposes that DOD officials
no longer hold this view.
Regarding assumptions numbers two and three, past trends
just do not support an optimistic view towards increases in
exchange [Ref. 87] and appropriated fund contributions to DOD
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs. A more pru-
dent management projection would be that, at best, they might
remain at a constant level. As for the remaining four assump-
tions, while time and events could easily affect their validity,
at the present time they represent the current situation. In
any case, they are external to the decision process of Navy
club officials.
B. DEVELOPING NEW CLUB REVENUE SOURCES
TO REPLACE PACKAGE STORE PROFITS
The Congressional mandate that all military package store
profits be diverted to recreational activities vice military
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clubs no later than the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1982,
has caused serious concern among Navy club officials. Some
substitute must be found to compensate for the loss to the
clubs of this large subsidy ($10 million in FY 1978) [88].
Possible ways to compensate for the loss of package store
contributions include:
-Lowering operation costs;
-Increasing the prices of bar drinks;
-Increasing the prices of food;
-Introducing club membership fees (i.e., dues);
-Cutting back on services that are either only
marginally profitable or unprofitable; and
-Increasing the club utilization rates for eligible
personnel
.
There are some tradeoffs and organizational constraints in-
volved with each of the above listed options.
Opportunities to achieve lower operational costs may be
realized through the elimination of redundant or unneeded per-
sonnel, increased efficiency in food and drink preparation,
tighter controls over inventories and cash handling, and
better procurement and receipt procedures. The overall effect
of these initiatives, however, could be constrained by rising
labor costs, elimination of some appropriated fund supported
billets, and tough competition from off-base clubs and res-
taurants .
Similarly, revenue gains produced by food and drink price
hikes over and above normal inflationary increases could well
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be offset by a number of factors. One obvious constraint is
the price elasticity of the various goods and services offered
by the clubs. It is conjecture at this point as to whether
club patrons will quietly accept sharp food and drink price
increases or take their business, in protest, to commercial
restaurants. The club manager must determine the combination
of food and drink price increases which will result in an
overall club revenue increase, while maintaining a level of
club patron utilization that can be used to justify continued
club operations. This is not an easy decision to arrive at.
The question of whether or not 'to charge club dues presents
another challenge to Navy club officials. While some club
managers feel that dues offer a panacea for their club revenue
problems, the traditional Navy position has been that dues
should only be employed as a last resort. Navy headquarters
club officials point out that the overall profit record of the
few Navy clubs that have employed dues has not been impressive
[Ref. 89]. They also stated that to date no Navy club that
has implemented dues has ever reverted back to a non-membership
basis. The shift to dues, in practice, appears to be a non-
reversible process [90]. There is another less obvious draw-
back to dues. The introduction of dues tends to shrink the
club patron base and in doing so clubs lose part of their
raison d'etre [91]. In written testimony before the 1979 NAF
panel, Navy officials stressed the point that their clubs
were, with the exception of 21 officer clubs, non-membership
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clubs--open to all eligible military personnel. The imple-
mentation of club dues on a large scale would weaken the Navy's
argument for continued Congressional support of Navy clubs
[Ref. 91].
Cutting back on marginally profitable or unprofitable club
services [e.g., a poorly patronized evening meal) could, in
some cases, improve club finances, but such moves may place
the club manager in conflict with local line officials, since
profitability is not the sole objective of military clubs.
The last suggested option, which is to increase the club
utilization rate, is only constrained by the imagination of
club officials. This option also obviates or lessens the need
for some or all of the other initiatives mentioned. The
trouble is that it is easier said than done!
Implementation efforts for any of the options noted above
may also be aided or further constrained by the overall Navy
club structure. For example, under the present decentralized
club structure, food and liquor price policies are established
by local management. Although Navy Military Personnel Command
--Code 65 CNMPC-Code 65) management assistance teams, Naval
Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) personnel, and local command audit
boards, can suggest appropriate prices, final adoption of club
prices rests with the local command. Under a centralized club
management system, these "suggestions'* could be made binding.
Likewise, audit recommendations on operational procedures and
marginal club services could be given more "teeth" under a
centralized club management system.
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As for dues, the centralization versus decentralization
issue becomes even more important. Presently, NMPC-Code 65
only has authority to establish an acceptable range of monthly
club dues and to initially approve/disapprove local club re-
quests to implement dues. With the impending loss of package
store profits, it is not unreasonable to expect a quantum leap
in the number of Navy clubs requesting authority to charge
dues. In the past, NMPC-Code 65 has approved all such
requests in spite of the Navy's stated policy discouraging
dues [92]. A major shift in the number of Navy clubs asking
to charge club dues would amount to having local commanders
dictating overall club policy to Navy headquarters officials
or vice versa.
C. ENSURING THAT CLUB ASSETS ARE FAIRLY
DISTRIBUTED ON A SYSTEM-WIDE BASIS
A persistent criticism of the Navy club system and those
of the other armed services is that they are structured in
ways that do not ensure that the recreational and entertain-
ment needs of service members at remote/overseas bases are
adequately met. For example, the Navy club system does not
impose special surcharges on the more affluent clubs in order
to subsidize vital but financially limited clubs overseas and
at remote U.S. bases. To a limited extent, it works the other
way around. Twenty-five percent of profits generated by over-
seas slot machines are diverted to the Navy Central Club Fund.
While some of this money eventually winds up supporting various
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overseas clubs, this money is also used to support Navy clubs
located in the continental United States (CONUS) [93]
.
Some potential options which would serve to ensure that
Navy personnel of all ranks have access to "acceptable" club
services worldwide include:
1. Shifting to "consolidated" clubs at bases where one
or more rank-segregated clubs are rated unsatisfactory
or uneconomical
;
2. Defining and applying different self-sufficiency
criteria to "essential" and "non-essential" Navy clubs;
3. Establishing system surcharges and subsidies to better
balance club services offered at affluent and finan-
cially weak Navy clubs;
4. Increasing club oversight authority at NMPC-Code 65;
5. Redistributing available military and appropriated
fund supported club billets so as to favor finan-
cially weak, "essential" Navy clubs; and
6. Ensuring that all new club construction and major
renovation projects are (a) based on genuine need
rather than the availability of funds, and (b) not
overlooking opportunities to incorporate rank-
consolidated features into the club design layout.
Increasing the use of consolidated clubs might provoke
some opposition from some Navy personnel; the amount of oppo-
sition aroused being directly related to the type of club
consolidation attempted. Figure 13 graphically depicts the
four basic types of Navy consolidated club models that are
normally employed [94] . Note that the models range from cen-
trally managed rank-segregated clubs in separate physical
buildings [Model I) to consolidated "all ranks" clubs (Model









































































4-1 ID 4U 3
1) —4 -4 •o


















<n •W 4J O 3
u .c d -h i-4
n$ O 0* <« CJU-l




























































l-< pH s 11
-4 ^ 1) 3
4-1
aj
.H .-1 tri u
11 3 nj i
T3 S e u
























































































of the cost-effective features of the "all ranks" model,
while still retaining some characteristics of the traditional
rank- segregated clubs. At the time of this writing, most
large Naval activities were operating some version of Model I.
Under Model I, separate physical club facilities were
maintained as before; however, a centralized local club man-
agement hierarchy was substituted for the independent manage-
ment that formerly existed at each individual club. This
centralization provided opportunities for cost reduction and
more effective club operations. Administrative functions
such as purchasing, accounting, and payroll processing were
particularly amenable to centralization. Individual club
managers may have objected to the loss of their autonomy,
but the club patron was probably not aware of the organiza-
tional changes that were taking place. As noted in the GAO
club report, this was not the case with the other club con-
solidation models.
Model IV, the "all ranks" clubs, are an anathema to many
senior Naval officers and enlisted members as well as to many
military retirees. Some members of these groups, in the manner
of the anonymous Navy officer, quoted earlier in chapter two,
would rather close the clubs than open them up to "all ranks."
Thus, a weakness, of the "all ranks" clubs is that they are
"unacceptable" to many potential users. As such, their use
to date has been restricted to remote overseas bases, where
they are the only economically feasible club set-up and where
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military personnel have few, if any, other entertainment
options
.
The hybrid clubs (Models II and III) also meet with some
resistance from service personnel favoring rank-segregated
clubs. The intensity of the resistance, however, is abated
somewhat by the inclusion of rank-segregated bar or dining
areas within the single physical facility. Models II and III
have been well received by personnel at new naval bases (e.g.,
U.S. Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington) where they
represented "additions" to the station's MWR assets rather
than "replacements" for existing rank- segregated clubs. From
an operational standpoint, these "single building clubs" can
eliminate redundant food preparation, utility, personnel, and
administrative costs.
In determining which form of consolidated club best suits
the needs of personnel at a particular base, Navy club offi-
cials and/or local commanders have to carefully weigh the
potential tradeoffs involved with each club option. There is
little point in constructing an "all ranks" club in an urban
area replete with other rank- segregated military clubs, or in
building a chief petty officer's (CPO) club at a base where
there are insignificant numbers of CPOs to support it. Mil-
itary tradition and good business sense are not mutually
exclusive by definition. In club-related situations where
they appear to be in conflict, some careful and unbiased anal-
ysis should be undertaken to better determine how the club
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should be structured. Whether or not the Navy opts for a
centralized or decentralized club management system, they
should develop and maintain checks to ensure that future club
construction/renovation projects are consistent with the per-
sonnel structure of the base in question.
Imposing a surcharge on small, remote, overseas or CONUS-
based Navy clubs to subsidize large, profitable, urban Navy
clubs would be inconsistent with DOD MWR objectives. Happily,
neither the Navy nor any of the other services have imposed a
regressive surcharge of this type. The Navy, for example,
allows each club to retain its cumulative earnings (save for
the 1-1/4 percent surcharge to cover expenses of the Mess
Central Accounting System- -MCAS) . While this approach has
not aroused resistance from club managers, as pointed out in
Chapter III, it tends to perpetuate rich/poor clubs. Further,
the level of club service that an individual service member
receives becomes a function of chance under this system. The
sailors assigned to a remote base, where the club is a neces-
sity, usually settle for a "shoestring" club operation while
their counterparts at more ideal locations receive a much
greater range of club services [95] . The system goal of pro-
viding all Navy personnel with a reasonable level of club
services is not really achieved under the present Navy club
system.
Any initiative to redistribute the system-wide wealth of
the Navy club system should be preceded by some determination
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of what clubs fall into "essential" and "non-essential"
categories. Subsidizing vital overseas and isolated CONUS
clubs with a percentage of profits from large, ideally located
Navy clubs would seem to foster DOD ; s stated MWR goals.
For example, self -generated revenues at small, isolated
Navy clubs could be augmented by subsidies derived from sur-
charges on revenue from the more affluent Navy clubs. Re-
allocation of system resources in this manner could upgrade
services at isolated clubs to an acceptable level while having
little or no negative impact on the financial position of the
larger clubs.
Reallocation of limited resources often breeds resentment
from those who become the net donors. Given the globe-trotting
nature of military personnel, however, it is not likely that
a reallocation of a small portion of club revenues would upset
military club patrons. Over the course of an individual's
military career, he will be assigned to many varied geograph-
ical locations; thus, the cumulative benefits/penalties of
club asset reallocations will tend to cancel each other out.
The real problem, then, becomes one of defining "essential"
and "non-essential" clubs. Since local commanders probably
have a parochial bias toward their own clubs, it would not
seem feasible to expect them to classify any or all of their
clubs as "non-essential." Officials at the Navy headquarters
level would necessarily have to evaluate all Navy clubs and
determine each club's degree of essentiality, based on some
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specified criteria. The criteria selected should be in con-
sonance with DOD and Department of the Navy (DON) MWR objec-
tives.
Figure 14 outlines one possible method of determining an
"essentiality" rating for each club. Under the system pre-
sented in Figure 14, overseas clubs, and to a lesser degree,
geographically remote Navy clubs within CONUS, would be more
"essential" than their counterparts in close proximity to
commercial restaurants and clubs (i.e., urban CONUS clubs.
Note that in Figure 14 the range of potential numerical rat-
ings varies for each club "essentiality" factor. The purpose
of weighting each factor differently is to take into account
their relative importance. For example, the author rated
"location" as being twice as important as "ranks of members."
A different rater might have an entirely different hierarchy
of club "essentiality" factors.
Club essentiality ratings (CERs) could be useful in deter-
mining possible surcharges/subsidies, assigning appropriated
fund supported club billets, and in evaluating the financial
performance of each club. Clubs with low CERs which consist -
ently lose money may need to be dropped from the system, while
a losing club with a high CER should be subsidized and kept
open. The author's proposed club rating scheme is admittedly
simplistic in that it only considers three factors and ignores
retirees and reservists, peculiar local conditions, and CONUS-






































































































00 03 3 X
P. Xi 2 3
03 S-« O fH



















cd 75 o 3
P aj 3 D
<D i T3
H (O i 3
H P X CD


























































































































75 S 2X •H O
3 X r-t































































































u 3. O 75
3 •H 3 X
<+4 x 3 3
75 rH














































set of criteria, club CERs could be developed and used to
allocate Navy club system resources in a way that ensures a
reasonable level of club services worldwide.
As an alternative to establishing CERs and redistributing
club assets, selected overseas and geographically isolated
CONUS clubs could be relieved of part or all of the burden
of paying central fund assessments on club sales (1-1/4 per-
cent) and slot machine profits (25 percent) . This method has
the advantage of avoiding arbitrary club rankings. A poten-
tial drawback would be that the existing central fund assess-
ment rate might have to be increased at urban CONUS clubs to
offset the loss of the overseas/remote area club assessments.
D. CLUB COMPETITION FROM COMMERCIAL/NAVY
EXCHANGE FOOD AND DRINK OUTLETS
In 1975, NMPC-Code 65 and the Navy Resale and Services
Support Office (NAVRESSO) jointly conducted an extensive
patron attitude survey of the leisure time eating and drinking
(LTEAD) activities of Naval personnel [96] . The LTEAD survey
showed, among other things, that Navy club patronage was being
siphoned off by Navy Exchange (NEX) food outlets (e.g., NEX
snack bars, cafeterias, hot dog wagons, mobile canteens, golf
course and bowling alley snack bars and vending machines) and
by off-base commercial food outlets. For example, the survey
noted that for the noon meal, a higher percentage of both
officers and enlisted respondents used the NEX cafeteria/
snack bars than the clubs. Off-base restaurants also took a
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significant number of noon meal patrons away from the clubs
[Ref. 97] . For the more expensive evening meal, respondents,
both officer and enlisted, overwhelmingly listed commercial
restaurants rather than military clubs as their usual dining-
out choice.
The complete LTEAD survey was over 130 pages long and its
full implications cannot be adequately summarized here. How-
ever, one passage related to perceptions of military clubs
was germane and is quoted below:
Only the CPOs and the more senior married officers look
upon their clubs as a career incentive to any significant
degree . .
.
In the final analysis, none of the patron groups consider
their club as an important part of their social life.
This is believed to be a major change from years past
when the Navyman's club often served as the "hub" of his
social activity [98]
.
In vying for a larger share of the military club patron
market, military clubs can in no way restrict the activities
of commercial entertainment outlets. For example, commercial
clubs can admit both officers and enlisted personnel. On
base, competition from NEX food outlets is also difficult for
clubs to eliminate because NEX profits also subsidize the base
recreation fund. Consequently, better salesmanship appears to
be the only plausible way of increasing Navy club patronage.
Until recently, Navy and other military clubs had some
distinct competitive advantages over nearby commercial res-
taurants. The edge was so significant that some managers may
not even have considered the off-base restaurants as competition
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Reductions in appropriated fund club support, inflation,
federal minimum wage laws, changes in military personnel
life styles, and finally, the loss of package store profits
have all but eliminated the significant cost advantage that
the clubs once enjoyed. Club managers are going to have to
sell the clubs to service members and not just rely on walk-in
traffic. Innovative menus and club events will have to be
good enough to convince married personnel to drive back to
the base for an evening meal out, since with an increasing
shortage of on-base military housing most military couples
live off-base [99]. A lot hinges on the professional Navy
club manager.
E. IMPROVING SYSTEM CONTROL OVER CLUB MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL
In the preceding chapter, shortcomings in the management
of civilian club managers were noted. In the 1980s the Navy
will have an even greater need to ensure that clubs are run
by competent managers. In this regard, some type of central-
ized personnel management system might be preferable to the
totally decentralized personnel system now in operation.
For example, a system in which club personnel management
authority is shared by NMPC-Code 65 and local commanders could
be implemented. Personnel management functions such as
recruitment of club managers, club management career develop-
ment programs, and inter-base club manager transfers/promotions,
could be handled by NMPC-Code 65. The local commander could
still retain the authority to evaluate and, if appropriate,
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even dismiss the club manager. Such a system would in all
probability be met with some reluctance from local commanders
desirous of maintaining total control over their club managers.
Their feelings could be assuaged somewhat by keeping the club
managers within the local commander's direct chain of command
[Ref. 100].
Another potential option for improving career opportuni-
ties for club managers would be to consider consolidating the
local club manager/package store organization with the local
recreational services hierarchy. As noted earlier, the Naval
Air Station, Moffett Field, California, as well as a number
of other Navy activities, has initiated a "Recreational
Services" organization of this type.
Since technical guidance over both Navy recreational and
club programs falls under NMPC-Code 65 cognizance, both fields
use the same accounting and personnel procedures, and both
fields are subsets of the larger MWR area; it would seem
natural that managers of Navy clubs and recreational activi-
ties could shift from one sub-specialty to another. Heading
a local "recreational services" division would be a senior
grade civilian MWR professional who could tie together all of
the local MWR elements (e.g., clubs, golf courses, child care
facilities, bowling alleys, and ticket services). In this
way, a more cohesive command MWR program could be presented
to the local commander and internal power struggles for limited
MWR resources could be replaced by a systematic allocation method,
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Positive byproducts of such an organizational structure
would be elimination of some redundant jobs (e«g-> purchasing,
accounting, and payroll) and establishment of a broader range
of local MWR jobs.
The higher graded MWR jobs resulting from such a reorgan-
ization would translate into more advancement potential for
qualified club personnel. In this regard, in 1979 a profes-
sional organization of military recreation managers, the
International Military Recreation Association, has been formed
under the auspices of the International Military Club execu-
tive Association (JMCEA) [Ref. 101].
F. ENSURING LOCAL COMPLIANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL,
DOD AND DON GUIDELINES
As Figure 8 points out, there are quite a few echelons
between the DOD organizational levels where MWR policies are
formulated and the local base level where these policies are
put into operation. Both Congress and GAO have decried the
lack of active DOD and DON involvement in club management.
GAO has gone so far as to advocate a central DOD club manage-
ment agency. The NAF panel in its 1979 club report did not
insist on a central club agency but instead called on the
services to provide more direct leadership at their individual
headquarters level.
Though all four branches of the armed services have had
flag level officers (i.e., generals and admirals) testify
before NAF panels, their day-to-day club headquarters operations
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are run by field grade officers (i.e., colonels and captains).
A question could be raised that if flag officers are required
to testify about MWR policies and programs before Congress,
why are they not required to run the MWR headquarters opera-
tion on a normal basis like the military exchange systems?
While not questioning the professional competence of the
present services' MWR heads, it is tough to imagine how a
field grade officer can effectively manage organizations (i.e.,
clubs) that fall under the direct control of more senior mil-
itary officials. In 1972, a DON MWR study group recommended
the establishment of the flag level position of Assistant
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Leisure Time Activities
to coordinate all Navy MWR programs [102]. The recommendation
was never implemented. In light of the importance of MWR
activities to the morale and effectiveness of Naval personnel,
a fresh evaluation of the merits of having a Navy flag officer
head up NMPC-Code 65 would seem appropriate.
Presently, NMPC-Code 65 functions primarily in a technical
capacity, which is consistent with the Navy's philosophy of
decentralized line management control over MWR activities.
Assuming that this philosophy remains constant, there are
still some steps which could be taken to strengthen the DON
headquarters' role in club management. They include:
-Upgrading the NMPC-Code 65 director's job to a flag
rank position
;
-Strengthening the audit capability of NMPC-Code 65;
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-Involving NMPC-Code 65 in the Navy club personnel
management process;
-Establishing CERs for each Navy club; and
-Granting NMPC-Code 65 authority to temporarily assume
operational control over clubs experiencing financial
difficulty.
The first four of these recommendations have already been
discussed at length. The fifth step, which has already been
implemented by the Army [103] represents a radical departure
from past practices and in the author's opinion should only
be taken after all available alternatives have been exhausted.
While NMPC-Code 65 might have the personnel resources to oper-
ationally manage one or two clubs for a limited time period,
there really is no feasible way for NMPC-Code 65 to staff
more than two clubs without shifting to a centralized club
management system. Taken as a group or individually, each
of these actions would strengthen the role of Navy headquar-
ters officials, while still allowing local commanders to
exercise considerable latitude in operating their clubs. At
the beginning of this chapter, the assumption was offered that
Congressional and GAO scrutiny of military clubs would not
dissipate in the years ahead. By strengthening the position
of NMPC-Code 65, DON officials can be more responsive to the
concerns of the Congress while improving their internal capa-




As the Navy club system moves into the 1980s, changes of
one type or another appear to be in the offing. A variety of
external pressures coupled with policy changes already an-
nounced Ci- e -> package store profit distribution and other
1979 NAF panel recommendations) make a "status quo" club
policy untenable. In developing club change proposal, Navy
club officials will have to consider more than just dollars
and cents. Clubs are so intertwined with the Navy's command
and rank structures that attempts to modify Navy clubs are
sometimes viewed as unnecessary and undesirable infringements
on basic command prerogatives.
A number of options have been mentioned as possible solu-
tions to existing club problems. Most of the options noted
have at least one potential drawback. No easy or risk-free
solutions have been advanced. The problems that Navy club
officials will have to successfully solve are: In what direc-
tion and how fast do we go? And while the past provides some
clues, the course is to a large extent uncharted.
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VI. ALTERING THE NAVY CLUB SYSTEM
A. PROBLEMS RELATED TO IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
Venerable traditional organizations are often very reluc-
tant to implement significant organizational change proposals
generated in-house or by outside observers. The history of
military clubs suggests that any attempts to abruptly change
the decentralized military club systems tends to exacerbate
fears and opposition from a number of sources. For example:
-Local commanders and their superiors in the chain of
command protest that their authority would be impinged;
-At the headquarters level, officials fear that proposed
club changes would erase some club features that are
unique to their particular service branch;
-Club managers become concerned that a new and unnecessary
administrative level would result from changes in the
club system; and
-The more traditional minded service members suspect
that changes (particularly in regard to club consoli-
dation) in the club system will serve to inhibit the
maintenance of "good order and discipline."
The complete list of potential stumbling blocks to implement-
ing a massive revamp of military clubs is endless.
Department of the Navy officials, along with their counter-
parts of the other services, have offered a plethora of reasons
for not changing their respective club systems. Their argu-
ments have basically stated that proposed club system changes
would:




-Possibly be perceived by many service members as
another in a series of "erosion of benefits" moves;
-Prove too inflexible for successful operation in many
locations
;
-Drive away some current club patrons; and
-Amount to an "overkill" reaction to some temporary
system problems. Stated another way--things are not
really that bad!
B. THE NEED FOR ALTERING THE NAVY CLUB SYSTEM STRUCTURE
Notwithstanding these and other arguments for maintaining
the "status quo," external factors noted in previous chapters
of this report suggest that, like it or not, some changes in
the Navy (and other armed services) club systems are inevit-
able. The club's external environment has changed over the
last few years and in order to avoid going the way of the
dinosaurs, Navy clubs must keep pace with the times.
The issue of package store profits demonstrates how self-
defeating a "do nothing" club policy can be. "Foot dragging"
on the 1972 House Armed Services Committee's non-appropriated
fund panel's (NAF panel) recommendation concerning package
store profit distribution only prolonged the inevitable.
Instead of an orderly phase-out of the Navy club's package
store profit subsidy, the Navy found itself in 1980 faced
with an edict to divert all package store profits to recrea-
tion activities by the end of FY 1982. Hopefully, having been
.through three NAF panel hearings since 1972, Navy officials
will take prompt action on the club proposals put forth by
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the 1979 NAF panel. If not, the centralized DOD club system
advocated by GAO and so vehemently opposed by the armed ser-
vices, may soon replace individual military club systems.
Once agreed that some changes will, in fact, be made to
the club system, Navy officials should, based on research
conducted as a part of this study, focus on:
-Determining what new changes will help make the Navy
club system more responsive to the DOD MWR objectives
noted in Chapter One of this study;
-Developing implementation methods and schedules which
would serve to minimize organization resistance to
club system alterations;
-Formulating contingency plans in the event of future
cuts in appropriated fund support to the clubs;
-Improving strengths of the existing club system;
-Improving career recruitment and retention of civilian
club management personnel;
-Increasing the interchange of club-related ideas and
programs between all cognizant officials and organiza-
tions involved in military club management; and
-Last, but certainly not least, the Navy must keep in
mind that the original reason for the clubs' existence
was to provide a wholesome off-duty entertainment and
recreational outlet for servicemen stationed at isolated
bases. Any proposed changes to the Navy club system
should not infringe on this objective.
C. PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO THE PRESENT NAVY CLUB SYSTEM
Based on the author's research, there are at least two
basic approaches that can be used in formulating club organ-
izational changes. Proposals can be made to dismantle the
existing club system and substitute' a completely new (and
hopefully better) system in its place. The alternative
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approach would be to retain the basic structure of the exist-
ing club system while strengthening, modifying, or eliminating
certain organizational elements. Both methods have their
advantages and disadvantages. The choice of which to use
hinges on one's initial perception of the worth of the exist-
ing system. GAO, in evaluating the entire DOD club system,
saw little merit in the present decentralized DOD club system
[Ref. 104]. The NAF panel, sufficiently impressed with cer-
tain features of existing individual club systems, pushed for
strengthening headquarters club management within the existing
club framework instead of creating a new consolidated DOD club
organization.
In developing proposals for changing the Navy club system,
the author took the position, based on thesis research, that
the basic structure of the Navy club system was sound. Conse-
quently, an abrupt shift from the present decentralized Navy
club structure to a centralized DON headquarters organization
model was ruled out. No inference has been made that a cen-
tralized DOD or DON club structure could not work. However,
as noted in previous chapters of this report, rancor arising
from dismantling the existing club system reduces the attrac-
tiveness of introducing a centralized military club system.
Alterations to the present decentralized club system could
accomplish the same ends with far less trauma.
The following specific recommendations which follow from
conditions presented in previous chapters of this study are
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offered as ways of improving management of the Navy clubs
while retaining the basic decentralized structure of the club
system.
1. Appoint a flag level officer (Rear Admiral) to head
NMPC-Code 65 on a full-time basis;
2. Expand and strengthen the in-house audit capability
of NMPC-Code 65;
3. Centralize certain club personnel management functions
which require system-wide coordination (e.g., recruit-
ing, career, development, job eligibility criteria);
4. Subsidize financially hard-pressed clubs at remote
and/or overseas locations;
5. Authorize NMPC-Code 65 to exercise more control
over club dues;
6. Develop closer ties with professional club manage-
ment groups;
7. Allocate available appropriated fund club billets
to the clubs which are most "essential";
8. Support efforts to develop and implement a simplified
set of realistic DOD club regulations;
9. Require NMPC-Code 65 approval prior to commencement of
new club construction/major renovation projects; and
10. Develop programs to eliminate any and all "myths"
about Navy club operations that currently exist.
Recommendation Number 1 :
By appointing a full-time flag-level head of NMPC-Code 65,
the Navy would be making a clear statement to all concerned
that central management of clubs and other recreation activ-
ities has increased in importance. Far from being just a
psychological ploy, this change would give NMPC-Code 65 more
"clout" in dealing with officials within the Navy command
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hierarchy as well as with, officials of external agencies/
organizations. The only impediment to implementing such a
move would be that the NMPC-Code 65 flag officer billet would
probably come at the expense of some other Navy program.
Recommendation Number 2 :
The suggestion to expand the in-house capability of NMPC-
Code 65 has already been accomplished to a limited extent.
In 1979, NMPC-Code 65 added a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
to their headquarters staff and authorized an additional audit
billet for their mobile club management assistance team.
While GAO, the Naval Audit Service, and local command audit
boards are all involved in club audits, none of these organi-
zations specializes in the club management area. It is ex-
tremely important that NMPC-Code 65 improve its in-house audit
capability in order to ensure that operations at the local
level are being carried out properly.
Recommendation Number 3 :
If the Navy club system is to prosper in the coming years,
Navy club managers are going to have to be the best available.
To ensure that well trained, competent club managers are staff-
ing Navy clubs, NMPC-Code 65 needs to take a more active role
in the personnel management area. While leaving the local
commander with the authority to direct, and evaluate, his club
manager's performance, NMPC-Code 65 should assume full recruit-
ment, hiring and transfer authority. Commanders could also
retain the authority to dismiss a manager when appropriate.
116

Sharing authority in this manner would preserve local control
over day-to-day cluh operations, while allowing NMPC-Code 65
to perform functions which are best performed by a central
agency.
Recommendation Number 4 :
The proposal to subsidize financially hard pressed Navy
clubs in some manner, recognizes the fact that even the best
management cannot overcome some of the adverse environmental
problems encountered at remote and overseas clubs. In con-
trast to private sector club organizations, the Navy should
not allow hard pressed but "essential" clubs to die simply
because they cannot turn a profit.
Recommendation Number 5 :
The Navy needs to translate its stated opposition against
club dues into a clear-cut policy. Once a dues policy is
adopted, NMPC-Code 65 should be given broad authority in this
area. Clubs should be forced to analyze the impact of pro-
posed dues on personnel attached to area ships and air squad-
rons and on the club's present financial situation. Further,
clubs should be required to explain why alternate means (e.g.,
price hikes, cutbacks in marginal services, club consolidation)
could not be used to achieve financial solvency. Approval to
charge club dues should only be granted for a specified time
period. Clubs would then be forced to periodically reevaluate
and document their continued need for dues.
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Recommendation Number 6 :
Professional club management organizations such as the
International Military Club Executives Association (IMCEA)
should be consulted when new club change proposals are still
in the staffing stage. Comments on the merits of each pro-
posed change should be solicited from the IMCEA. In this way
potential problems and misconceptions related to club change
proposals could be resolved prior to implementation. Since
managers are going to be tasked to make the system work better,
it would be a good idea to involve them as much as possible in
formulating new policies. Close communication with the IMCEA
and similar organizations is a painless yet effective way of
accomplishing this objective.
Recommendation Number 7:
In recent years, Congress has reduced the number of appro-
priated funded club positions. At the time of this writing
there are no effective mechanisms in place to ensure that any
future reductions in appropriated fund club billets are equi-
tably apportioned among the individual Navy clubs. It is
therefore possible that "essential" clubs might lose some
appropriated fund club billets while appropriated fund billets
at large urban clubs remained intact. Such arbitrary personnel
cuts do not adequately consider the special needs of some
"essential" Navy clubs. Consequently, NMPC-Code 65 should be
given authority to specify which clubs should/should not bear
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the brunt of any Congressionally mandated reduction in the
number of appropriated fund club billets.
Recommendation Number 8 :
The Navy, Marine, and Army-Air Force Exchange systems
have been operating for some time under unified DOD exchange
regulations, and both the GAO and the NAF panel have recom-
mended establishing a similar set of DOD club rules to replace
existing service regulations. Since there appears to be
little if any opposition to such a change, the Navy should be
actively involved in drafting the DOD club regulations.
Hopefully, the DOD club regulations will be minimal in size
and complexity and will guide rather than frustrate club
managers
.
Recommendation Number 9 :
All new club construction and major club renovation pro-
jects should be funneled through NMPC-Code 65 for approval.
This requirement should apply to both appropriated and non-
appropriated funded projects. NMPC-Code 65 should determine
whether the club project in question is really needed; if an
adequate patron base is available to support the addition;
whether nearby DOD clubs could provide the same service; the
adequacy of the physical club layout; and the membership





Recommendation Number 1Q :
Finally, at all club management echelons, a greater effort
should be made to educate Navy personnel about club operations.
Much has been said (pro and con) about local commanders' abil-
ity/inability to manage the clubs. If a local commander has
acquired a good background in club management, it is not be-
cause that individual had been exposed to any formal Navy
instruction in this area. For example, the Financial Manage-
ment Guidebook for Commanding Officers [105] does not include
any mention of club management procedures
.
While NMPC-Code 65 officials have recently begun to address
participants at Washington based seminars for prospective com-
manding officers of Naval shore stations [106], efforts of
this type have been minimal to date. Young officers and en-
listed personnel have not been indoctrinated at boot camp and
officers' candidate schools on club operations. They get their
information, and a great deal of misinformation, about the
clubs through the "grapevine." It is not surprising that
"myths" about the clubs abound.
Many personnel believe that clubs are a form of "compensa-
tion" for being in the military [107] . This may have been
true twenty years ago but is it the case today? Others feel
that the club should offer cheap prices, excellent services,
and convenient hours of operation [108J . Beleaguered club
managers often find it hard to meet these high patron expec-
tations, and still break even financially. Unquestionably in
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the future club patrons are, through one device or another,
going to pay higher costs for club services than in the past.
It is important that they understand why and where these costs
are being incurred. Navy clubs have a good product to sell
and larged untapped client populations. To date, a marketing
approach has not been universally promoted within the club
system. It should be pushed far more aggressively in the
future.
D. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON MILITARY CLUBS
In the introductory chapter of this report some rather
lofty DOD club objectives were set forth. Who, if anyone,
could take issue with these goals? Looking further, however,
one discovers the bitter truth that lofty goals or not, some-
one has to pay for the military clubs.
Through the years consensus has varied at the Congressional
level as to who that someone should be. In the last decade
the trend has been to reduce the clubs' dependence on appro-
priated funds and package beverage profits. In essence, the
current theory is that club patrons should pay the full cost
for club services [109] . The era of "cheap" club food and
drink prices appears to be coming to an end. How, then, will
the club system ensure its survival? Are military clubs
really needed any longer? After having done considerable
research in the club management area, the author has concluded
that the answer to these two questions is dependent on the
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on the amount of club usage that clubs are able to generate
among active duty military personnel. If the clubs can in-
crease the number and frequency of active duty personnel in-
volved in club activities, then military clubs can better
fulfill their stated objectives. On the other hand, as club
utilization declines, so does the clubs' overall contribution
to the morale of military personnel.
This study has looked at the beginnings, the growing
years, and recent declines in the fortunes of the military
club system. Optimism that present day club problems can be
turned around leads to hope that the end of military clubs is
not in sight. After all, Armies, Navies and now Air Forces
and Marine Corps still do not supply all the needs of their
people. In conducting this research, the author noted that
there are many dedicated government and private sector offi-
cials who are committed to improving military club operations.
The problem is that some of their efforts are fragmented. It
is very important that necessary adjustments are made to the
military club system which will enable the clubs to adapt to
present and future environments. To achieve this end, any
and all reasonable ideas related to improving club management
should be carefully explored by top level DOD and DON officials,
Where necessary changes are warranted, hard decisions should
be made. Tradition and command prerogatives should be factors
in charting the future course of the club system, but they
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